Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1988

State of Utah v. Michael C. Thompson and Bruce A.
Conklin : Brief in Opposition to Certiorari
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
John F. Clark; John K. West; Sessions & Moore; Attorneys for Defendants.
David L. Wilkinson; Attorney General; Stephen J. Sorenson; Stanley H. Olsen; Richard M.
Hagstrom; Robert N. Parrish; Attorneys for Plaintiff.
Recommended Citation
Response to Petition for Certiorari, Utah v. Thompson and Conklin, No. 880181.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1988).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2123

This Response to Petition for Certiorari is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Utah Supreme Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

JTAH
OOCUMEff
< FU
i.6,9
S9
im

ago IB t
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 880-181

Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Priority Classification
No. 13

MICHAEL C. THOMPSON and
BRUCE A. CONKLIN,

Defendants-Petitioners.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, RESPONDENT
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Chief, Litigation Division
RICHARD M. HAGSTROM
STANLEY H. OLSEN
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent State of Utah
JOHN F. CLARK
JOHN K. WEST
SESSIONS AND MOORE
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84102
Attorneys for

Defendants-Petitioners

FILED
JUN r> 1988
€h*

Cow*. I H *

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No.

880-181

Priority
No. 1 3

Classification

vs.
MICHAEL C . THOMPSON and
BRUCE A. CONKLIN,
Defendants-Petitioners.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI FOR THE STATE OF UTAH, RESPONDENT

DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General
STEPHEN J. SORENSON
Chief, Litigation Division
RICHARD M. HAGSTROM
STANLEY H. OLSEN
ROBERT N. PARRISH
Assistant Attorneys General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for PlaintiffRespondent State of Utah
JOHN F . CLARK
JOHN K. WEST

SESSIONS AND MOORE
400 First Federal Plaza
505 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorneys for Defendants-Petitioners

TABU:'. Ul' ','ONTh

QUESTIONS t»HK: hN J'Mi "'"< avyfym

1

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION.

2

IATEMENT OF JURISDICTION..
CONTROLLING CONS) r

'v

STATEMENT

,

THK, CASE

.

.

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2
2

PROCEEDINGS BELOW
STATEMENT OK FACTS
RELATED CASE

5

ARGUMENT
I.

A.

B.

.

5

THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION FOR A
WRIT OF CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONERS HAVE
NO STANDING TO INVOKE THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
WITH RESPECT TO THE EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT
THEM AT TRIAL, BUT EVEN IF THEY DID, THE
GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION APPLIES

6

PETITIONERS HAVE Nu STANDING TO CHALLENGE
THE MAJORITY OF THE EVIDENCE ADMITTED
AGAINST THEM AT TRIAL BECAUSE THE SUBPOENAS
USED TO GATHER THE EVIDENCE WERE NOT SENT TO
PETITIONERS

6

EVEN IF PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SUBPOENAED EVIDENCE, THE COURT
OF APPEALS' DECISION ON THIS ISSUE COMPORTS
WITH THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS IN STATE V.
MENDOZA AND IN THE MATTER OF A CRIMINAL

INVESTIGATION,

9

-l-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

II.

(CONTINUED)

DEFENDANTS WERE PROPERLY CONVICTED OF A
CRIMINAL BOYCOTT UNDER THE UTAH ANTITRUST
ACT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS 1 DECISION
SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
A.

PETITIONERS NOT ONLY PAID BRIBES TO UTAH
POWER AND LIGHT'S SECURITY DIRECTOR BUT
ENGAGED IN ACTS INTENDED TO RESTRAIN TRADE..

B.

THE ILLEGALITY OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT AROSE
FROM THE CONSPIRACY TO FORECLOSE COMPETITION
FOR AN EXCLUSIVE DEALING ARRANGEMENT NOT
FROM THE CONTRACT ITSELF

C.

PETITIONERS MISTAKENLY ATTEMPT TO APPLY THE
"TARGET AREA" TEST OF ANTITRUST STANDING TO
THE COURT OF APPEALS' GROUP BOYCOTT
DEFINITION

III.

THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF PETITIONERS' RICE CONVICTIONS; THE COURT
OF APPEALS CORRECTLY RESOLVED THIS ISSUE BY
NOTING THE WELL-RECOGNIZED DISTINCTION
BETWEEN MERE PREDICATE OFFENSES AND
RACKETEERING

IV.

A JUROR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVICTION OF A
CO-DEFENDANT DOES NOT MERIT THIS COURT'S
EXERCISE OF CERTIORARI JURISDICTION

CONCLUSION

-ii-

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
Page
CASES CITED
Barry v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 555 F.2d
3 (1st Cir. 1977), aff'd sub nom. St. Paul &
Marine Insurance Co. v. Barry. 438 U.S. 531
(1978)

16,17

Burrows v. Superior Court. 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974)....

8

Central Telecommunications, Inc. vf TCI Cablevision,
Inc.. 800 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1986), cert, denied.
107 S.Ct. 1358 (1987)

15

Corev v. Look. 641 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981)

16

Illinois v. Krull. 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987)

10,11

In the Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv.
Rep. 3 (March 31, 1988)
6,9,10,12
Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Ltd.. 547 F. Supp.
633 (D. Alaska 1982)

13,14

Rakas v. Illinois. 439 U.S. 128 (1978)

7

State v. Fletcher. 751 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1988)

5

State v. Hanson. 627 P.2d 53 (Utah 1981)

18

State v. Hodoes. 517 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1974)

19

State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987)

6,9-12

State v. Nance. 20 Utah 3d 372, 438 P.2d 542(1968))....
State v. Montayne. 414 P.2d 958 (Utah), cert, denied.
385 U.S. 939 (1966)
State v. Thompson, et al.. 751 P.2d 805 (Utah App.
1988)
State v. Velarde. 734 P.2d 440 (Utah 1986)

18
7
2,11,13-20
20

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)
Page
CASES CITED
U n i t e d S t a t e s v . C a l a n d r a , 414 U . S . 338 (1974)
U n i t e d S t a t e s v . F i e l d . 432 F . S u p p . 55 ( S . D . N . Y .
a f f ' d 578 F.2d 1371 (2d C i r . 1 9 7 8 ) , c e r t .
d i s m i s s e d , 439 U . S . 801 (1978)
U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Leon, 468 U . S . 897 (1984)
United S t a t e s v. M i l l e r .

425 U . S . 435 (1976)

7
1977),
18
9-11
7

STATUTES CITED
Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 6 - 5 0 8 ( 1 ) (a)

(1978)

13

Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6 - 5 0 8 ( b )

2

Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 1 0 - 9 1 4

2

Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 1 0 - 9 2 0

2

Utah Code Ann. S 7 6 - 1 0 - 1 6 0 3
Utah Code Ann. S 7 8 - 2 - 2 ( 5 )

2, 3
(1987)

2

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
Lafave, Search and Seizure, section 1.3, p. 44

8

Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court

1, 12

Utah Rule of Evidence 103

20

-iv-

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
VS.

ii

Case No. 880-181

1

MICHAEL C. THOMPSON and
BRUCE A. CONKLIN,

it

Priority Classification
No. 13

Defendants-Petitioners,

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Was the trial court correct in admitting evidence

obtained by the use of the Subpoena Powers Act?
2.

Is a contract, combination or conspiracy to

foreclose competitiors from bidding for or submitting proposals
for exclusive, lucrative security guard contracts a criminal
group boycott under the Utah Antitrust Act?
3.

Is racketeering a crime separate from the predicate

offenses to racketeering, thus meriting separate punishment?
4.

Did a juror's knowledge of the conviction of a co-

defendant require a mistrial?

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The Court of Appeals' decision, of which petitioners
seek review, is State v. Thompson, et al.. 751 P.2d 805 (Utah
App. 1988).
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to grant or deny the
defendant's petition for writ of certiorari pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. S 78-2-2(5) (1987).

Petitioners seek review of the Utah

Court of Appeals decision entered March 9, 1988, which was denied
rehearing on April 8, 1988.
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The controlling constitutional and statutory provisions
are reproduced in full in the appendix to this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendants have petitioned this Court for a writ of
certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals, seeking to challenge the
court's affirmance of a jury verdict and conviction of petitioner
Michael C. Thompson, of five counts of bribery in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508(b), each a Class B misdemeanor; one
count of antitrust violation under Utah Code Ann. SS 76-10-914
and 76-10-920, and two counts of racketeering in violation of
Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1603, each a felony of the second degree;
and of petitioner Bruce A. Conklin, of five counts of bribery in
violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-6-508(b), each a Class B
misdemeanor, one count of antitrust violation under Utah Code
Ann. SS 76-10-914 and 76-10-920, and one count of racketeering in
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violation of Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-1603, a felony of the second
degree.

Co-defendant Michael Ziemski's convictions were also

affirmed by the Court of Appeals in this casef but defendant
Ziemski did not petition this Court for a writ of certiorari.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This case was tried to a jury in Third Judicial
District Court, Judge Judith M. Billings, presidingf on July 19
through August 1, 1985.

Following trialf the jury found each

defendant guilty of five counts of bribery and of all antitrust
and racketeering counts (R. 408-413).
On September 13f 1985, the trial court sentenced
petitioner Thompson to serve not less than one year nor more than
15 years in the Utah State Prison (R. 455-457).

Petitioner

Conklin was sentenced to serve one year in the Salt Lake County
Jail on work release (R. 440-443).

Defendants were each fined

$25,000.00 for the antitrust violations (R. 441, 448), and were
forced to forfeit their interests in the guard companies.
Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on September 13,
1985.

Petitioner's sentences were stayed on appeal, and their

initial brief as well as the State's response was filed in this
Court.

Subsequently, the case was transferred by this Court to

the Utah Court of Appeals.

The case was then certified to this

Court by the Court of Appeals, but was returned to the Court of
Appeals where the case was briefed and argued.

The Court of

Appeals affirmed petitioners1 convictions in an opinion published
March 9, 1988, and denied petitioner's Petition for Rehearing on
April 8, 1988.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Between 1976 and early 1984, L. Brent Fletcher was
employed as security officer for Utah Power and Light Company
(UP&L) (R. 737-9).

As security officer, Fletcher's duties were

to determine the security needs of the company, make
recommendations to management, and act as coordinator between
management and the security guard services (R. 738-9).

In 1978,

UP&L decided to hire the services of a security guard company on
a full-time basis.

On Fletcher's recommendation, UP&L executed a

contract with defendant Michael Thompson's company, Mike Thompson
Associates (MTA), in February 1978 (R. 739-40).

This contract

was not competitively bid (R. 741-2)•
In 1979, Jack Wall, Fletcher's brother-in-law, was
hired by MTA (R. 980-2).

At Fletcher's request, Wall opened a

bank account in the name of Security Management Consultant
Services (R. 991-2).

Between January and June 1979, Wall

deposited approximately $23,000 in checks from MTA into this
account (R. 1340).

In June 1979, Wall turned over the account

and its records to Fletcher at his request (R. 995). UP&L and
MTA renewed their contract in March 1981 (R. 742-4).
Thompson left MTA in 1982 and formed Information
Associates, a security consulting firm, with defendant Bruce
Conklin, a former employee of MTA (R. 239-40).

Defendant Michael

Ziemski, also a former employee, took control of MTA and signed a
new contract with UPfcL in October 1982 (R. 750-1).

Ziemski later

changed the name of MTA to Vanguard International Associates,
Inc. (R. 752). In 1983, Ziemski transferred control of Vanguard
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to Conklin (R. 752). An assignment of the UP&L contract was
executed in March 1984 (R. 755).
During the spring of 1983, Information Associates
deposited approximately $25,000, in seven separate payments, into
the account of Augie Investments, also owned by Fletcher (R.
1336).

Meanwhile, Vanguard deposited about $163,000 into the

account of Information Associates (R. 1337)•
RELATED CASE
In State v. Fletcher. 751 P.2d 822 (Utah App. 1988),
the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of Brent Fletcher.
ARGUMENT
Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court provides
examples of circumstances in which it is appropriate for this
Court to exercise its discretion in granting the writ of
certiorari. While this list is not exclusive and does not
purport to limit this Court's discretion in granting the writ, it
would appear that this Courtfs certiorari jurisdiction will be
invoked only in unusual circumstances.
Petitioners seek to characterize the opinion of the
Court of Appeals in this case as extraordinary, in order to
persuade this Court to exercise the extraordinary certiorari
jurisdiction.

However, the Court of Appeals properly followed

precedents from Utah, and where appropriate, from other
jurisdictions, in deciding petitioners1 appeal, and there is no
need for this Court to disturb the ruling of the Court of Appeals
through granting the writ of certiorari.
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I.
THIS COURT SHOULD DENY THE PETITION FOR
A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BECAUSE PETITIONERS
HAVE NO STANDING TO INVOKE THE
EXCLUSIONARY RULE WITH RESPECT TO THE
EVIDENCE USED TO CONVICT THEM AT TRIAL,
BUT EVEN IF THEY DID, THE GOOD FAITH
EXCEPTION APPLIES
Petitioners refer to this Court's decision in In the
Matter of a Criminal Investigation. 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March
31, 1988), and State v. Mendoza. 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987),
seeking to obtain the writ of certiorari by noting that the
exclusionary rule and good faith exception were addressed in
their case by the trial court before these opinions were
published, and by the Court of Appeals before In the Matter of a
Criminal Investigation, supra, was published.

However,

petitioners' main argument focuses on the good faith exception
analysis, which is relevant only after the exclusionary rule is
applied.

As petitioners noted on page 67 of their brief on

appeal, the majority of the evidence used to convict petitioners
"consisted primarily of business records obtained from
defendants' accountants and banks."

To this evidence,

petitioners have no standing to object.

While petitioners would

have had standing to object to the admission of evidence gained
through subpoenas directed at them, petitioners never alleged,
let alone established, a violation of their personal rights.
A.
PETITIONERS HAVE NO STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE MAJORITY OF THE EVIDENCE
ADMITTED AGAINST THEM AT TRIAL BECAUSE
THE SUBPOENAS USED TO GATHER THE
EVIDENCE WERE NOT SENT TO PETITIONERS

-6-

Under both Utah and federal law, petitioners may not
seek the suppression of evidence under the exclusionary rule
unless they can show a violation of their fourth amendment
rights.

State v. Montavne, 414 P.2d 958, 960 (Utah), cert.

denied. 385 U.S. 939 (1966).

See also Rakas v. Illinois. 439

U.S. 128, 134 (1978), citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338, 347 (1974).

While the exclusionary rule is sometimes

applied differently to evidence obtained by warrant and evidence
obtained by subpoena, a violation of a fourth amendment right is
a necessary prerequisite to obtaining suppression of evidence
gathered by either.

United States v. Miller» 425 U.S. 435

(1976) .
Petitioners have failed to establish a violation of
their fourth amendment rights relating to the evidence gained
through the Subpoena Powers Act, because the majority of the
evidence they seek to challenge was not obtained from them, but
from various banks and accountants.

Appellant's Brief to the

Utah Court of Appeals, 67. As to any other evidence which may
have been admitted, the petitioners fail to establish how the
admission of such evidence was a violation of their
constitutional rights.

Numerous cases demonstrate that in these

circumstances, petitioners have no standing to challenge the

-7-

evidence obtained by subpoenas sent to third parties.^
While this Court has repeatedly noted its desire to
establish independent constitutional analysis under the Utah
Constitution, the facts in this case do not justify the creation
of a new privacy interest under the Utah Constitution.

Courts

recognizing a privacy interest in bank records under their state
constitutions have only done so when there is a complete lack of
court process in the seizure of records, e.g.» Burrows v.
Superior Court, 529 P.2d 590 (Cal. 1974), and state courts
generally reserve their expansion of state constitutional search
and seizure provisions for cases in which there is an immediate
and intimate violation of privacy interests.

See Lafave, Search

and Seizure, section 1.3, p. 44

x

See United States v. Miller. 425 U.S. 435, 444 (1976) ("Since
no Fourth Amendment interests of the depositor are implicated
here, this case is governed by the general rule that the issuance
of a subpoena to a third party to obtain thee records of that
party does not violate the rights of a def endant") j SEC v. Jerry
T. O'Brien. Inc.. 467 U.S. 735, 743 (1984) ("It is established
that, when a person communicates information to a third party
even on the understanding that the communication is confidential,
he cannot object if the third party conveys that information or
records thereof to law enforcement authorities. Relying on that
principle, the Court has held that a customer of a bank cannot
challenge on Fourth Amendment grounds the admission into evidence
in a criminal prosecution of financial records obtained by the
Government from his bank pursuant to allegedly defective
subpoenas, despite the fact that he was given no notice of the
subpoenas"), gee also Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165
(1969) ("[D]efendants failed to establish any prejudice to their
own constitutional rights. . . . They wrongly seek to establish
prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a
consequence of a search and seizure directed at someone else and
failed to prove an invasion of their own privacy").
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B.
EVEN IF PETITIONERS HAVE STANDING TO
CHALLENGE THE SUBPOENAED EVIDENCE, THE
COURT OF APPEALS1 DECISION ON THIS ISSUE
COMPORTS WITH THIS COURT'S ANALYSIS IN
gTATE V. MENDOZA AND IlLJEHJEJ^JSR QF A
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
In State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), this
Court struck down the statutory good faith exception relied on by
the trial court in admitting the evidence obtained under
subpoena.

While this Court declined to endorse the United States

Supreme Court's Leon analysis of the exclusionary rule and good
faith exceptionf this Court noted that the exclusionary rule is
applied when there is a fourth amendment violation, and that the
good faith analysis may apply thereafter if an exception to the
application of the exclusionary rule is warranted.

Mendoza at

185, 186.
The Court of Appeals did not address directly
petitioners1 lack of standing to invoke the exclusionary rule
against all the evidence gained under the Subpoena Powers Act,2
but proceeded directly to analyzing whether or not the nonstatutory good faith exception should apply.3

2

"Defendants contend the government's actions were in violation
of their individual rights to and expectations of privacy."
State v. Thompson. 751 P.2d 805, 808 (Ut. App. 1988).
3

The Court of Appeals apparently misread this Court's opinion in
Mendoza. "Furthermore, section 77-35-12(g) went beyond the scope
of the good faith exception in requiring defendants to prove a
substantial violation of their fourth amendment rights."
Thompson at 809. In Mendoza. this Court struck down Rule 12(g)
because "12(g) . . . shifts the burden of proof to the defendant,
who must prove the equivalent of police conduct made in bad faith
before the court can apply the exclusionary rule." I&. at 186.
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In Mendoza, this Court's discussion of United States v^
Leon. 468 U.S. 897 (1984), and of Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct.
1160 (1987), focused on the basis for the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule:

"[Elxcluding illegally-seized evidence

when a police officer has received authorization to conduct a
search, has restricted his search to the boundaries of the
authorization, and has a reasonable basis for relying on the
authorization would defeat the ends of justice.Mfrtendoza,at
185.

See also Mendoza, n. 3 ("In both cases, the officers

conducting the searches did so in objectively reasonable reliance
on prior, external authorization11) . While this Court did not
expressly adopt the deterrence rationale as the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, Mendoza at 185, this Court's language
discussing that purpose describes the circumstances in the
instant case.
Judge Bunnell authorized the investigation, and the
Attorney General's agents relied on this authorization and the
Subpoena Powers Act itself in conducting the investigation.
Thus, there was reliance on external authorization for the
subpoenas.
This Court in In the Matter of a Criminal
Investigation. 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 31, 1988), found that
in the investigation conducted by the Attorney General in this
case, the Subpoena Powers Act was:
• . .improperly applied in at least
three respects:
First, each subpoena included a
statement that it was "authorized by order of
the District Court" and that "disobedience to
this order is punishable by contempt of
Court."
-10-

•

• •

The second aspect of the Act's improper
usage is the failure of the state's attorneys
to notify every respondent, prior to
interrogation or production of evidence, of
the general nature and scope of the
investigation and of the right to exercise
the privilege against self incrimination.
• • •

Finally, we find that the secrecy
provisions of the Act were applied too
broadly.
Id. at 17. None of these improprieties have been demonstrated to
have any connection with these petitioner's rights under the
fourth amendment or Utah Constitution.
Under the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary
rule, the good faith exception would apply to the facts of this
case, in the event that petitioners had shown a violation of
their fourth amendment rights justifying the initial application
of the exclusionary rule.

The Court of Appeals' language in this

case demonstrates that, contrary to petitioners' allegation, the
court did not shift the burden of showing bad faith to
petitioners, but analyzed the facts of this case in applying the
good faith exception:
In Mendoza, the Utah Supreme Court
noted, "Krull does not affect our
characterization of Leon, In both cases, the
officers conducting the searches did so in
objectively reasonable reliance on prior,
external authorization." 748 P.2d at 185 n.
3. Likewise, in the instant case, the
subpoenas duces tecum were executed in
objectively reasonable reliance on prior,
external authorization.
State v, Thompson. at 809-810.
Petitioners cite no authority for distinguishing
between police officers, attorneys, or investigators in the

11-

context of the good faith exception.

Nothing in In the MattejL QL

a Criminal Investigation nor in Mendoza changes the initial
burden which petitioners must meet to establish a violation of
their rights and their entitlement to suppression of evidence.
At no stage during this case have petitioners challenged any
subpoena issued personally to them, nor established any standing
to raise issues vicariously involving subpoenas issued to third
parties.

Thus, the ruling of the Court of Appeals should stand

and this Court should reject the Petition for Certiorari.
II.
DEFENDANTS WERE PROPERLY CONVICTED OF A
CRIMINAL BOYCOTT UNDER THE UTAH
ANTITRUST ACT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS'
DECISION SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED
Preliminarily, petitioners suggest that their petition
for a writ of certiorari as to the antitrust convictions should
be granted because:

(1) one member of the Court of Appeals panel

filed a dissent;* and (2) this is the "first published judicial
treatment of Utah's Antitrust Act." (Pet. at 12) . 5

However,

neither argument meets the requirements of Rule 43 of the Rules
of the Utah Supreme Court for granting the writ.

Without saying

it, petitioners apparently rely upon Rule 43(3) of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court to support their petition when they argue
4

Judge Orme dissented only as to the antitrust convictions of
petitioners.
5

While it is true that this is the first published decision
under the present Utah Antitrust Act, Utah Code Ann. S 76-10-911
et seq.. there were several decisions under the prior, similar
act. ££e, £*£•# Gammon v. Federated Milk Producers Association
14 Utah 2d 291, 383 P.2d 402 (1963); Zions Service Corp. Vj
Danielson, 12 Utah 2d 369, 366 P.2d 982 (1961).
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that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that:

(1) bribery

plus other affirmative acts in restraint of trade may violate the
Utah Antitrust Act; (2) the illegal conduct involved in this case
was not merely the competitive effect of an exclusive dealing
arrangement but was the foreclosing of competition for that
contract; and (3) the object of a group boycott may be all
competitors of the conspirators, in this case, all the security
guard companies who wanted to compete with petitioners for both
the UP&L security guard contract but who were prevented from
doing so by the boycott of petitioners and UP&L's security
director.
As will be demonstrated, no error was made and the
petition should be denied.
A.
PETITIONERS NOT ONLY PAID BRIBES TO UTAH
POWER AND LIGHTS SECURITY DIRECTOR BUT
ENGAGED IN ACTS INTENDED TO RESTRAIN
TRADE
The Court of Appeals held, citing Municipality of
Anchorage v. Hitachi Ltd., 547 F. Supp. 633, 645 (D. Alaska
1982), that "[w]hen bribery is coupled with other acts tending to
restrain trade, a claim under the Sherman Act may be
established."

Thompson. 751 P.2d at 810-11.

The Court of

Appeals correctly held that the conduct of petitioners was not
only commercial bribery, but was also an illegal group boycott.
The dissent concluded that under the definition of
commercial bribery, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508(1)(a) (1978), and
the majority's interpretation of it, every commercial bribe would
be an antitrust violation.

Thompson. 751 P.2d at 819.

This is a

• fUnHnAfA- Araument logically rejected by the majority:

Commercial bribes paid to an employee, agent,
or fiduciary of UP&L could be for other
purposes, including rate adjustments, waiver
of service fees, and waiver of safety
requirements. Such purposes are clearly not
in restraint of trade or anticompetitive.
!£• at 811.

Those acts do not illegally restrain trade.

Here,

however, there were several affirmative acts in restraint of
trade:

"[T]he prosecution presented substantial evidence of

other affirmative acts in restraint of trade, e.g., Fletcher's
refusal to accept proposals from other security guard
companies...11 (jji.) and the refusal to submit the security guard
contracts to competitive bidding.

Id.6

Such conduct represents the "other acts tending to
restrain trade" with which the bribery was "coupled."

Hitachi.,

* The United States Supreme Court has long held that any
agreement with its purpose to eliminate competitive bidding is
illegal. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States. 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1977); Swift and Company v. United
States. 196 U.S. 375 (1905). If UP&I/s security director, L.
Brent Fletcher, had been required by the company to accept
competitive bids, but those bids were rigged so that petitioners
received the lucrative security guard contract, that conduct
would clearly be criminal bid rigging. Utah Code Ann. § 76-10920. But for the fact that that one of the objects of the
conspiracy was to prevent competitive bidding of the security
guard contracts, the boycott here would clearly have been an
illegal bid rig. The effect of the illegal boycott upon
competition is the same as an illegal bid rig.

•14-

supra. 547 F. Supp. at 645.'
B.
THE ILLEGALITY OF DEFENDANTS' CONDUCT
AROSE FROM THE CONSPIRACY TO FORECLOSE
COMPETITION FOR AN EXCLUSIVE DEALING
ARRANGEMENT NOT FROM THE CONTRACT ITSELF
Petitioners attempt to disguise their conduct as an
"agreement to deal exclusively with one party [which] necessarily
contemplates a refusal to deal with other parties."
13).

Petitioners miss the point.

(Pet. at

The conviction of petitioners

was not because the contracts were illegal but was because the
group boycott conspiracy foreclosed competition for the
contract.8

See, e.g.P Central Telecommunications. Inc. v. TCI

Cablevision. Inc.. 800 F.2d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 1986), cert.

1

A commercial bribe and an antitrust violation are not mutually
exclusive. In this case the payment of money to L. Brent
Fletcher was simply the quid pro quo for Fletcher's aid in the
anticompetitive conduct. It is only natural that an employee
with the ability to award lucrative contracts is going to want to
benefit for the risk of his anticompetitive conduct. Mallev-Duff
k Associates v. Crown Life Insurance Co.. 734 F.2d 133 (3d Cir.),
cert, denied. 469 U.S. 1072 (1984). (Compare the benefits Mr.
Lloyd, an employee of Crown Life, received for his participation
in a group boycott with L. Brent Fletcher's benefits received for
his participation in the boycott. The only difference is
Fletcher was charged with the crime of commercial bribery, Mr.
Lloyd was not.)
8

The legality or illegality of an exclusive dealing arrangement
looks to the competitive effect of the contract to determine
whether or not it is an unreasonable restraint of trade in
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1975),
Twin Cities Sports Service. Inc. v. Charles 0. Finlev jmd CpAr
676 F.2d 1291, 1304 n. 9 (9th Cir.), cert, denied. 459 U.S. 1009
(1982) (cited by petitioners, Pet. at 14), or whether the effect
of it "nay be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly..." in violation of Section 3 of the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1914). Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal
£&., 365 U.S. 320 (1961). The contract itself was not challenged
in this case.
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denied. 107 S.Ct. 1358 (1987).

In Corey v. Look, 641 F.2d 32

(1st Cir. 1981), the First Circuit rejected the identical
"exclusive dealing" argument made here by petitioners and stated
that such an argument "emphasizes the innocuous and ignores the
ominous. . • subverting [of] normal commercial bidding to exclude
appellant . . . On its face, this amounts to 'a concerted refusal
to deal with a disfavored purchaser or seller.1M

641 F.2d 35-36

(citing ^arry v. St. PfluJL Fir? ft Marine Insurance Qo. , 555 F.2d
3, 1 (1st Cir. 1977) , af f'd sub nom. gt. Paul & Marine Insurance
Co, v. Barrv. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).9

The normal competitive

process for the security guard contracts was clearly subverted by
the boycott of petitioners in this case.10
C.
PETITIONERS MISTAKENLY ATTEMPT TO APPLY
THE "TARGET AREA" TEST OF ANTITRUST
STANDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' GROUP
BOYCOTT DEFINITION

* The conpiracy between the petitioners and L. Brent Fletcher was
identical to that in Corev. The only difference was that the
Town of Falmouth, Massachusetts, unlike Fletcher, received no
commercial bribes. Petitioners1 argument is to the effect that
because the remuneration paid to Fletcher violated the commercial
bribery statute, there can be no restraint of trade. This
argument is not supported by the law.
10

Petitioners1 reliance upon Construction Aggregate Transport v.
Florida Rock Industries. Inc.. 710 F.2d 752 (11th Cir. 1983) is
misplaced. The conduct involved there was unilateral not
conspiratorial. 710 F.2d at 773. But the court recognized that
even unilateral conduct in an exclusive dealing arrangment is not
free from judicial scrutiny if there is "proof of competitive
harm, or other illegal behavior." !£. The "other illegal
behavior" here included inter alia the unlawful agreement to
boycott petitioners1 competitors and to refrain from competitive
bidding.
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Petitioners attack the Utah Court of Appeals'
definition of group boycott and argue that there must be "a
specific identifiable entity which has been singled out as the
•target1 of the alleged boycott."

Pet. at 15.

The simple answer

to this argument is that in St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.
v. Barrv. 438 U.S. 531f 541 (1978), the Court rejected such a
limitation of the group boycott definition.

Instead, the Court

held that the object of a group boycott can include not only
competitors of the conspirators (438 U.S. at 542), as here, but
can include the class of all policyholders or purchasers of
services. Id., at 544. The Utah Court of Appeals aptly relied on
the

Barry decision to conclude that petitioners1 boycott was of

all the security guard competitors of petitioners, gee Thompson,
751 P.2d at 8 1 3 . U
Clearly, the Utah Court of Appeals applied
substantial United States Supreme Court precedent and other
federal court precedent in correctly interpreting and
applying the Utah Antitrust Act.

Therefore, this Court

should not grant a writ of certiorari to review the Utah
Court of Appeals1 decision to affirm the antitrust
convictions.

xx

Petitioners rely on Reaemco. Inc. v. Allegheny Airlines, 496
P.Supp. 546, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) for its "single entity, target
area test." Reaemco discussed the "target area" test of
antitrust standing and not as applicable to the group boycott
definition. Since the Reaemco decision, the "target area" test
of standing has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court
in favor of a multi-factor standing test. Associated General
Contractors of California v. California State Council of
Carpenters. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
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III.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT GRANT A WRIT OF
CERTIORARI TO REVIEW THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PETITIONERS' RICE
CONVICTIONS; THE COURT OF APPEALS
CORRECTLY RESOLVED THIS ISSUE BY NOTING
THE WELL-RECOGNIZED DISTINCTION BETWEEN
MERE PREDICATE OFFENSES AND RACKETEERING
Petitioners, as they did on appeal to the Utah Court of
Appeals, argue that their convictions under RICE "for misdemeanor
briberies" violated their eighth amendment rights.

The Court of

Appeals correctly identified the weakness in petitioners'
argument:
In reviewing a claim of disproportionate
punishment, the question is "whether the
sentence imposed in proportion to the offense
committed is such as to shock the moral sense
of all reasonable men as to what is right and
proper under the circumstances." State v.
Hanson. 627 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1981) (quoting
State v. Nance. 20 Utah 3d 372, 438 P.2d 542,
544 (1968)) .
Defendants1 argument ignores the
additional elements required under the RICE
Act, i.e. a pattern of racketeering activity,
existence of an enterprise, and use of
proceeds derived from the racketeering
activity to establish, acquire, or operate
the enterprise. Defendants claim these
elements are illusory. We disagree. It is
not the commercial briberies that are being
punished in the present case, but the broader
conduct which is forbidden by the RICE Act.
££• United States v. Field, 432 F.Supp. 55
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd 578 F.2d 1371 (2d Cir.
1978), C££i. dismissed. 439 U.S. 801 (1978)
(Congress entitled to make pattern of
racketeering an independent criminal offense
punishable more severely than simply twice
the penalty for each constituent offense).
We do not find defendants1 sentences for the
RICE violations unconstitutionally
"shocking."
ThQKPgPP* at 815-816.
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Petitioners present no argument for challenging these
precedents, but merely continue in their refusal to recognize the
independent crime of racketeering.

These circumstances do not

justify this Court's issuance of the writ of certiorari.
IV.
A JUROR'S KNOWLEDGE OF THE CONVICTION OF
A CO-DEFENDANT DOES NOT MERIT THIS
COURT'S EXERCISE OF CERTIORARI
JURISDICTION
P e t i t i o n e r s c l a i m t h a t t h e Court of Appeals should have
r e v e r s e d t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s and g r a n t e d a m i s t r i a l i n t h e i r

case

because of t h e c u m u l a t i v e e f f e c t on t h e j u r o r s when two of

the

s t a t e ' s w i t n e s s e s mentioned t h e t r i a l of p e t i t i o n e r ' s c o c o n s p i r a t o r , L. Brent F l e t c h e r , when one j u r o r read about
F l e t c h e r ' s c o n v i c t i o n before p e t i t i o n e r s ' t r i a l c o n c l u d e d , and
when t h e p r o s e c u t i o n used e v i d e n c e of F l e t c h e r ' s use of c a s h , of
"UP&L employee misconduct, 1 - and when t h e p r o s e c u t i o n used "bank
records."
P e t i t i o n e r s c l a i m t h a t t h e Court of Appeals gave " s h o r t
s h r i f t " t o t h e s e e v i d e n t i a r y d i s p u t e s , b u t f a i l t o i s o l a t e any
error i n the Court of Appeals' a n a l y s i s .

The c o u r t

specifically

addressed the i s s u e of the t r i a l and c o n v i c t i o n of L. B r e n t
F l e t c h e r , following t h i s Court's d i r e c t i o n t o defer to the
judgment of the t r i a l c o u r t , p u b l i s h e d i n S t a t e v. Hodges. 517
P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1 9 7 4 ) .

The Court of Appeals c o n c l u d e d :

[ d e f e n d a n t s . • . f a i l e d to show any c l e a r
abuse of the t r i a l c o u r t ' s d i s c r e t i o n . The
t r i a l court and counsel both questioned the
j u r o r . The juror i n d i c a t e d the f a c t of
F l e t c h e r 1 8 c o n v i c t i o n had no impact on her
d e l i b e r a t i o n s and was not d i s c u s s e d with the
other jury members. Furthermore, the t r i a l
-19-

court adequately instructed the jury to only
consider the evidence introduced at trial.
Thompson at 818.
The court correctly noted that in order to reverse a
conviction on the grounds of the admission of inadmissible
evidence, a defendant must show that the admission had Ma
substantial influence in bringing about the verdict."

Thompson

at 818, citing Utah Rule of Evidence 103 and State v. Velarde,
734 P.2d 440, 448 (Utah 1986).

The court correctly noted that

petitioners never demonstrated that the remaining allegedly
erroneous admissions of evidence were prejudicial, and thus
dismissed petitioners1 evidentiary challenges.

Thompson at 818.

The Court of Appeals correctly followed Utah precedent
in evaluating the evidentiary disputes, and in petitioning for a
writ of certiorari, petitioner has neither questioned the Court
of Appeals' compliance with Utah precedent, nor presented any
argument that this Court should reconsider that precedent.

In

short, petitioners have presented no grounds to induce this Court
to exercise its extraordinary certiorari jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the writ should be denied.
DATED t h i s

(OTJV

day of

O^IA^.

, 1988.

.Jb//.(QiL.
STANLEYJH. OLSEN
Assistant Attorney General

RICHARD M. HAGSTROW
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and
Respondent,
v.
L. Brent FLETCHER, Michael C Thompson. Bruce A. Conklln and Michael
Z&enuki, Defendants and Appellants.
No. 86W57-CA.

I Criminal Law OM4.H2)
£ven though statute allowing issuance
0 f gttbpoena duces tecum in connection
^ ^ secret investigations was subsequently f{?und to be unconstitutional, materials
^t^jned pursuant to subpoena duces tec u m were admissible in subsequent erimi^ j /prosecution, where investigators acted
Jood faith, U.C.A.1953, 77-45-12(g);
b
UJ5.£-A- ConstAmend. 4.

Court of Appeals of Utah.
March 9, 1988.
Defendants were convicted in the
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Judith M. Billings, J., of bribery, racketeer
s*g, and slate antitrust vxftntions, and £>ey
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J.,
held that (1) evidence that defendantssuppliers of security guard services for
utility—bribed utility official in order to
preclude other security guard companies
from competing for contract was sufficient
to establish conspiracy and restraint of
trade in violation of state antitrust law; (2)
state Racketeering Influences and Criminal
Enterprise Act was not unconstitutionally
vague due to fact that its application was
aot limited to aerious and aggravated offenses by organised crime; and (8) finding
of "pattern" for purposes of RICE Act was
supported by evidence that defendants paid
aevea different bribes in two-week intervals lor separate purposes.
Onne* J n dissented in part and (Bed

if affidavit in support of arrest
warrants faOed to establish probable
aaj resulting illegality did not void
t» pesvdtts its)
Enforcement of subpoena duces tacum
k subject to Fourth Amendment restrictions Sfainst uareaaooable aearches and

VJ.CJL OssttUami. 4.

^ monopolies o»31(14)
findings that suppliers of securities
igj^jces for utility participated in comroerCJJLJ pribery, and that bribed official refused
^ ^xept proposals from other security
£UAJ ^ companies, were sufficient to estabsupport suppliers' convictions under
to
^ ^ Antitrust Act U.OA.1M3, 76-6Monopolies 0*11(1.14)
f er se group boycott exists where two
or 0>ore competitors on same level of marj t e t structure agree to eliminate target borj^ptal competitor by combining to deny
fMrget of elements needed in order to cornpet/
I Monopolies O-ltfl.lS)
jtule of reason analysis has no part in
j
njnal
provisions of state Antitrust Act
er 1
M*&>
76-10*20.
VC
t

Monopolies 0-1*1.4, 1.14)
Croup boycott under state Antitrust
j ^ requires at least two conspirators, but
mflft*** iMnfiwa A \*>7tt&»» nor ^few
g^ket relationship with target is determh
ngljvt of criminal KabOity; rather, intent of
^tract* combination, or conspiracy is daeM jpg element U.CJU968, 76-10-080.
7

Monopolies *»S1(U>
Evidence of agreement between fade*
dent
suppliers of security services for
peP
gtflfty and utility official, wherein official
w i l bribed to refuse proposals from other
iggiirity guard companies, was sufficient to
igpblish {pbtence of conspiracy is form of
gwpuP boycott for purposes of stats AntiJ ^ t A e t U.CJL1KI, T*-1*-ttO.
u
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I Criminal Law * 4 1 |
When specific intent of defendant It
element of criminal offense charged, intent
may be inferred from defendant's conduct
and surrounding circumstances.
1*. Monopolies *»S1(1S)
Finding that suppliers of security
guard serrices for utility specifically intended to eliminate competition was supported by evidence that suppliers bribed
utility's security officer to refuse bids from
other security guard companies. U.CJL
1963, 76-10-614 to 76-10420.
1L Disorderly Conduct #-1
State Racketeering Influences and
Criminal Enterprise Act is not limited in
application to persons affiliated with organised crime. U.CJL196S, 76-10-1601 to
76-1O-1601
I I Disorderly Conduct *»1
State Racketeering Influences and
Criminal Enterprise Act was not unconstitutionally vague due to its failure to limit
its application to serious and aggravated
offenses by organised crime. U.CJL1953,
76-10-1601 to 76-10-1608; UACJL Const
Amend. 14.

criminal episodes as basis for pattern.
U.CJU953, 76-1-401; U.CJLW68, 76-101602(4) (1»85).
16. Disorderly Conduct *•*
Finding that defendants participated in
''pattern" of criminal activity sufficient to
support convictions under Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act was
supported by evidence that defendants paid
seven different bribes in approximately
two-week intervals, and that there was separate purpose for each bribe. U.C.A.1953,
76-1-401;
U.CJL1953, 76-10-1602(4)
(1985).
17. Criminal Law e»U711(3)
Instruction in bribery prosecution,
which required showing of conduct contrary to interest of and without consent of
employer, was not reversible error, even
though jury was not specifically instructed
that illegal bribe had to be paid with criminal intent

11 Criminal Law *-667
Defendants charged with commercial
bribery were not entitled to mistrial after
two witnesses mentioned trial of official
who accepted bribes and one juror told
11 Disorderly Conduct ^ 1 1
court that she had read of official's convic8tatute pennfttng felony sentence for tion* during trial; juror indicated fact of
violation* of state Racketeering Influences official's conviction had no impact on her
and Criminal Enterprise Act based on pred- deliberation and was not discussed with
icate misdemeanor of commercial bribery other jury members, and jury was instructdid not violate constitutional restraint ed to consider only evidence introduced at
against disproportionate punishment D.C. trial
A.1968, 76~l<M602(lXh) (IMS).
UL Pbocdetty Ccninrt »»1
Statute allowing nse of misdemeanor
offense of commercial bribery aa predicate
Criminal Enterprise Act was not tmumtst
ent with hsbltusl criminal statute or enhancement provision 6f Cuutioosd Balk
•taaeea Act U.CJL190, »~l?-8(l)(»Xii&
T**4W1; U.CJL196S, W-1<M«*1. 4k

ft-ift-ieoaa-o otm.

Max D. Wheeler, Rodney R. Parker (argued), Snow, Christensen 4 Martineau,
8aH Lake City, for defendants and appellants.
David L WDdnson, State Atty. Gen.,
Stephen J. Sorenson, Chief, litigation Div.,
Richard M. Hagitroo (argued), David J.
8chwendimaB (argued), Robert N. Parriah,
Stanley ft Oisen, Aa*V At*ya. Gen* for
plaintiff end respondent

State FsfVKeei til Iafioenoes #nd
Balm BENCH, DAVtDSOMLand
Crtnbal Ehtetprise Act> <sflntton ef
*£attera" aennlras nmuiafte tet nriated. dftNCJJ.
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OPINION
BENCH, Judge:
Defendants appeal their convictions on
several counts of bribery, antitrust, and
racketeering. This appeal was initially
filed with the Utah Supreme Court and was
transferred to this Court pursuant to
RUtah S.Ct 4A. We affirm the convictions.
Facts
Between 1976 and early 1984, L. Brut
Fletcher was employed as security officer
for Utah Power and Light Company (UP 4
11. AM security officer, Fletcher's duties
were to determine the security needs of the
company, make recommendations to
management, and act ee coordinator between management and the security guard
services. In 1978, UP 4 L decided to hire
the services of a security guard company
en a fun-time basis. On Fletcher's reeom•fcendatioo. UP 4 L executed a contract
with defendant Michael Thompson's company, Mike Thompson Associates (MTA), in
February 1978. This contract was not competitively bid.
In 1979, Jack Wall, Fletcher's brother*law, was hired by MTA. At Fletcher's
reqnest, WaO opened a bank account in the
name of Security Management Consultant
Services. Between January and June 1979,
Wall deposited approximately $23,000 in
cheeks from MTA into this account In
June 1979, WaO turned over the account
aad its reoords to Fletcher at his request
UP A Land MTA renewed their contract in
M*rtfcl96J.

During the spring of 1983, Information
Associates deposited approximately $25,000, in seven separate payments, into the
account of Augie Investments, also owned
by Fletcher. Meanwhile, Vanguard deposited about $163,000 into the account of
Information Associates.
The State of Utah, alleging these multiple payments to Fletcher were bribes as
part of a scheme to eliminate competition
for the UP A L security contract, charged
Thompson with seven counts of commercial
bribery, each a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. { 76-6~508(b)
(1978), one count of antitrust group boycott, a second degree felony in violation of
Utah Code Ann. f| 76-10-914 and -920
(1979), and two counts of racketeering, second degree felonies in violation of Utah
Code Ann. | 76-10-1603 (1981). Ziemski
and Conklin were each charged with seven
counts of bribery, one count of antitrust
group boycott, and one count of racketeering. Fletcher, also a defendant, was
charged with counts similar to Thompson.
Fletcher was tried separately and convicted
prior to defendants' trial. His appeal is
also decided this date. S*e State v. Fletcher, 751 P.2d 822 (Utah App.1988).

Pretrial motions to dismiss all counts
were denied. Defendants' motion to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a secret investigation in Emery County was
also denied. The case was tried to a jury
on July 18 through August 1, 1985, the
Honorable Judith M. Billings presiding.
The jury found each defendant guilty of
five counts of bribery and of all racketeerTbotnpeoo left MTA b 1982 and formed ing and antitrust counts. Motions for misInformation Associates, a security coosuh- trial were denied. Thompson was senfag firm, with defendant 3roee ConkHn, a tenced to serve notices than one nor more
former employee of MTA. Defendant Mi- than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
cfcac! Oemakt, ako a former employee, took OookMn and Ziemski were each sentenced
eootrol of MTA aad signed a new contract to serve one year in the Salt Lake County
with UP 4 L i n October 1982. S a a s U Jafl on work release. Each defendant was
lsler changed the name of MTA to Van- fined 125,000 far the antitrust violations.
gnard International Aaeodatae, Inc. . in Bfcsed on the racketeering convictions, the
1968, Bemsld transferred control of Van- court also ordered forfeiture of all business
guard to ConkHa. An assignment of the Interests of defendants in the guard compeOP 4 1 contract wan Stttsftd in Mareh a r s Involved fa the ease. The sentences
aB flayed pending appeal.
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On appeal, defendant* challenge the jur- poenas duces tecum to accumulate most of
isdiction of the trial court and the court's the evidence used at trial, including tax and
denial of their motion to suppress certain bank records from defendants" accountants
evidence. Defendants also challenge spe- and banks. Upon a motion by defendants
cific jury instructions, each of their convic- challenging the constitutionality of the Act,
tions, and the trial court's denial of their Judge Bunnell concluded the Act had been
motion for a mistrial.
abused and was subject to continual abuse
Jurisdiction and Probable Cause for AT* due to its broad terms and provisions.
Judge Bunnell declared the Act unconstiturmi
(1] Defendants first argue the affidavit tional, dismissed the investigation, and
upon which their arrest warrants were quashed all outstanding subpoenas. The
based failed to establish probable cause. prosecution's appeal of that ruling is now
The arrest warrants were therefore alleg- pending before the Utah Supreme Court
edly invalid, and the trial court was de- In ihe Matter of a Criminal Investigaprived of Jurisdiction over defendants. The tion, No. 20268 (Utah Wed Oct 25, 1984).
Utah Supreme Court has "rejected] the
Based on Judge Bunnell's ruling, defendposition that the probable cause require- ants fDed a motion to suppress all evidence
ment for arrest warrants is jurisdictional.'9 seized pursuant to the investigation. After
State « Sekreuder, 712 ?2d 264, 272 a hearing on December 27, 1984, Judge
(Utah 1985). In Sekreuder, the defendant Billings held Judge Bunnell's ruling to be
challenged her conviction on the ground the law of the case. However, in a memothat the statement presented in support of randum decision dated January 10, 1985,
the arrest warrant failed to establish the Judge Billings denied defendants' motion to
requisite probable cause The Court, as- suppress. TYie evidence was subsequently
suming lack of probable cause for the pur* admitted to prove the substance of the
poses of discussion, adopted the majority Crimea charged.
rule that an "Segal arrest or detention
The basis for the trial court's denial of
does not void a subsequent conviction."
defendants'
motion to suppress was as folML at 271 (quoting Gerttein % Pugh, 420
lows:
U-S. l t t , 119, 96 &<X 864, 865-66, 43
The appropriate standard for suppression
LXAM 64 (OT6)). The Court explained:
of the evidence acquired under the "Subf i l e ] probable cause requirement for an
poena Powers Act" in this case requires
arrest warrant becomes moot b j the time
that the defendants show, as the State
a defendant has been convicted because
contends,
a "substantial violation" of dethe moch more stringent requirements of
fendants'
constitutional rights and that
proof at trial have been employed tp pro*
the
violation
was "not committed in good
toct the defendant
faith," aa required by Rule 12(g), Utah
Q 2 P J d a * * f t In light of ScArwfrr, we
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 77hold defendants' challenge to the trial
16-12(g)). Defendants have neither accourts jurisdiction Is moot.
knowledged tiiis Rule, nor attempted to
AdmissOkHtg^Emdenm
meet the required showing for suppression of evidence.
Defendants i t s * argue the trial court
m i la daayfag thssr motto to suppress
On appeal, defendants daim the evidence
attain evidence. The instant ease began to the instant case waa obtained without
with M aecret fa?eet%etioei conducted in legal process and should therefore be supEmery County wdsr the authority ef pressed. Defendants contend the governTadga/Boyd QBQMB, Seventh District ment's actions were In violation of their
Court* aod pursuant to Utah Code Annotat- individual rights to and expectations of pri»
ed M TT-©-i through -4 (196% commoafy vucy.
referred to aa ths Subpoena Power? Apt ar
* s Utah MkMkwfi Jwy AA During
HJ The enforcement of a subpoena dieIhe sms^^lttsx fsjijUKiw athn aafrt e # ea tecum is subject to fourth siiumdin—t

STATE v. FLETCHER

Utah 809

O U M T I I TJd MS (UufcAp*. tttS)

restriction! against unreasonable searches
Although section 77-85-12(g) is now inand seizures, although not to the extent of valid, the good faith exception to the exclua search warrant Oklahoma Pre** Pub. sionary rule under L*on is still valid.
Co. * Walling, 827 US 186, 66 S.Ct 494,
Defendants argue the good faith excep80 LEd. 614 (1946). Defendants' claims to tion applicable to search warrants does not
an expectation of privacy are rights pro- apply to the execution of subpoenas issued
tected under the fourth amendment Ba- pursuant to a statute subsequently deku a Illinois 489 US 128, 99 S.Ct 421, clared unconstitutional. This position is
68 LEA2d 887 (1978). Furthermore, contrary to Illinois v. Krull, — U.S.
,
*Xe]videnoe is suppressed or excluded only 107 S.Ct 1160, 94 LEd.2d 864 (1987). In
if the same was obtained by a riolation of Krull, the Court granted certiorari to dethe Fourth Amendment, designed to pro- termine whether the good faith exception
tect a person's right to privacy and proper- to the exclusionary rule should be recogty." Stat* % Montoyn*, 18 Utah 2d 88,41, nized when officers act in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing
414 FM 968, 960 (1966).
In United State* v. Leon, 468 U-S. 897, warrantless administrative searches where
104 &Ct 8406, 82 LE<L2d 677 0984), the the statute is ultimately found to be unconUnited States Supreme Court created the stitutional. An Illinois statute permitted
government officers to conduct warrantgood faith exception to the exclusionary
less searches of the records of dealers in
rule: where an officer acts in objectively
automobiles and automobile parts. Such a
reasonable reliance on a subsequently insearch showed Krull to be in possession of
validated warrant, the exclusionary rule
stolen automobiles. Subsequent to the
does not apply. The Utah state legislature search, a federal court in an unrelated matcodified the Leon good faith exception in ter held the Illinois law to be unconstituUtah Code Ann. | 77-85-18(g) (1982). As tionally broad. Upon motion by defendant,
previously discussed, the trial court denied the trial court suppressed the evidence
defendants' motion to suppress for failure based on the federal court ruling. The
to meet the requirements of section 77-86* Illinois Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting
life*
the state's good faith exception argument
However, the Utah Supreme Court reThe United States Supreme Court recently invalidated section 77-85-12(g). In versed. The Court explained the good
Stat* si Mendorn, 748 PJd 181 (Utah faith exception was established because the
1987), the Court rejected the prosecution's deterrent effect and remedial purpose of
argument that the good faith exception the exclusionary rule are not served where
should apply to an invalid, warrantless stop an officer acts in objectively reasonable
and search of a vehicle. H * Court ex- reBance on a search warrant issued by a
plained that because "no outside authority neutral magistrate. Likewise, the Court
on which the officers could reasonably rely held, "if [a] statute is subsequently deexpressly authorised the search . . . , the clared unconstitutional, excluding evidence
policy foundations of the Leon exception do obtained pursuant to It prior to such a
tot appear fe searches of [this Und)." Id. judicial declaration wiD not deter future
sftltt. Furthermore, section 77-8HKg) Fourth Amendment violations by an officer
wept ooyonu me scope or me gooo num who has simply fulfilled his responsibility
exception in requiting defendants to prove to esfotte the statate aa written.9' ML 107
i substantial violation fcf their fourth a O t at 1167 In Mendoea, the Utah Suamendment righta. Since section f7-J£- preme Court ntted, "Krnll does not affect
12(g) purported to create a goon faith ax* nor characterisation of Leon* In both
dtoptioti tb an investigatory flop and search cease, the officers conducting the searches
end because ft Improperly shifted the bu> dU so in eBJectively reasonable mttanee on
den of pnm^ the Court fcstnd the statuts prior, external authorisation." f « 8 P J * a t
violated the fssorth amendment of the Unit* 1 8 6 * 8 . likewise, In the instantjaae, the
ed States
m
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objectively reasonable reliance on prior, external authorisation.
[ t ] 'Thif Court may affirm a trial
court's decision to admit evidence on any
proper ground, even though the trial court
assigned another reason for its ruling.
State * Barber, 747 P.2d 436 (Utah App.
1987). Regardless of the decision of the
Utah Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the Utah Mini-Grand Jury Act, we
hold the evidence obtained pursuant to the
subpoenas duces tecum was admissible under the principle set forth in KrulL The
trial court's denial of defendants' motion to
eupptcps is affirmed.
Antitrust and "Group Boycott"
Defendants contend they were improperly charged with and convicted of conduct in
vtoetfte of the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah
Godtjknn. H T M 0 4 U through -926
(1979)£ IWs is the first criminal prosecution tider the Utah Antitrust Act and is
thus'a case of first impression. T^e general provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act are
simflaf in many respects to their federal
counterparts in the Sherman Act, 15U.S.C.
H 1 through 7 (1987). Section 79-10-926
provides, *T^e legislature intends that the
court*; in construing this act, wfD be guided by "interpretations given by the federal
courts to comparable federal antitrust statutes ghd by other state courts to comparable state antitrust statutes."

Defendants point out there are three elements to the offense charged in the instant
case: (A) a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint of trade in violation of
section 70-10-914; (B) in the form of a
group boycott; and (Q with specific intent
to eliminate competition.
(A)
Defendants argue federal courts uniformly have refused to find commercial
bribery to be a contract, combination, or
conspiracy in violation of section 1 of the
Sherman Act Commercial bribery is defined in Utah Code Ann. f 76-6-«08(b)
(1978) as follows:
A person . . . without the consent of the
employer or principal, contrary Co the
interests of the employer or principal . . .
confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon
the employee, agent, or fiduciary of an
employer or principal any benefit with
the purpose of influencing the conduct of
the employee, agent, or fiduciary in relatr
ing to his employer's or principal's af-

In United State* t. Boeton and Maine
Railroad, 880 U.S. 167, 162, 85 S.Ct 868,
871, 18 LEd.2d 728 (1965), the United
States Supreme Court held, "[I]t is doubtful that this indictment . . . alleges anything more in substance than a bribe.
Bribery might well be in the family of
offenses covered under a conflict of interSec&ou 76-10-9140) of the Utah Anti- eat statute. But it is more remote from an
trust Act, fike section 1 of the Sherman antitrust frame of reference." In CalnetAct ntatae, "Every contract, combination iee Corp. «. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,
la thf form tt trust or otherwise, or eon- 582 PJd 974 987 (9th Or.1976), cert deflpiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is nied, 429 VS. 940,97 S.Ct 855, 50 LEd.2d
declared to be IDegaL* Section 76-10-920 909 (1976), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appftum piovioss.
peals held, *tQ]ommercial bribery, standing
^lay,person who violates taction 76-10- alone, does not constitute a violation of the
f } 4 by prioe fixing, bid rigging, agreeing Sherman Act" And in Municipality of
mnfng competitors to divide customers Anchorage % Hitachi Cable, l*L, 647
ar^^rritories. or by engaging b a group F5upp 688,646 (D Alaska 1982), the court
boycott with spedfic intent of eHmtnat* held, Commercial bribery does not in itself
h g competition shaD be punished, If an constitute a violation of the Sherman Act"
individual by a fine not to exceed $G0r
WhOe it is true that commercial bribery
990 or by imprisonment for an indeter- alone is not conduct in violation of federal
minate time not to exceed one year, or antitrust law, Twjben the bribery is coufro* «r, If by # person n t h * thaa an pled with otifcr acta tending to restrain
U M d a a l 9 fim net » ancead $199,990. trade, a data under the Sherman Act may
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be established." Hitachi. 647 F-Supp. at
646; see aUo Associated Radio Sere. Co.
* Page Airway* Inc., 824 F.2d 1S42 (6th
Qr.lttO). In the cases cited by defendants, there was no evidence of any affirmative acts, coupled with the bribery, to restrain trade. In the instant case, however,
the prosecution presented substantial evidence of other affirmative acts in restraint
of trade, e.g., Fletcher's refusal to accept
proposals from other security guard com14] The dissent suggests that, under
the majority opinion's view, every commercial bribery in which the payee performs
his end of the bargain would be an antitrust violation. Such is not the case. Commercial bribes paid to an employee, agent,
or fiduciary of UP A L could be for other
purposes, including rate adjustments, waivar of service fees, and waiver of safety
requirements. Such purposes are dearly
not in restraint of trade or anticompetitive.
Furthermore, had defendants paid Fletcher
the bribes in order to influence him to deal
exclusively with them only after he had
received other bids, their actions arguably
would not have been a conspiracy entered
into primarily to eliminate competition or
restrain trade. However, b the instant
ease, the primary purpose of the bribes
was to restrain trade by eliminating all
competition for the UP 4 L security eontract The first element of the offense was
therefore Established.

To determine that question the court
must ordinarily consider the facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint
b applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of
the restraint, and its effect, actual or
probable. The history of the restraint,
the evil believed to exist, the reason for
adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all
relevant facts. This is not because a
good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation, or the reverse;
but because knowledge of intent may
help the court to interpret facts and to
predict consequences.

Id at 238, 88 S.Ct at 244. In other words,
"the factfinder [must] decide whether under all the circumstances of the case the
restrictive practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition." Arizona *
Maricopa County Med Sot, 457 VS 882,
843, 102 S.Ct 2466, 2472, 73 LJft2d 48
(1W2).
While federal courts have utilised the
rule of reason in determining the legality
of most restraints alleged to be in violation
of the Sherman Act, they have also, by
experience, been able to categorize certain
business practices or relationships as per
ae unreasonable. In Northern Pacific
Railway Co. v. United State* 856 U.S. 1,
6, 78 S.Ct 514, 618, 2 LEd.2d 545 (1»58),
the United States Supreme Court held,
"XTJhere are certain agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect
(B)
Defendants next argue their alleged on competition and lack of any redeeming
agreement with Fletcher did not constitute virtue are conclusively presumed to be una group boycott, and, therefore, the prose- reasonable and therefore Illegal without
cution failed to estabikh the second ele- elaborate inquiry aa to the precise harm
ment of the offense. Federal courts have they have caused or the business excuse
long held that whether a particular action for their use." These per se practices inor agreement violates the 8berman Act de- clude price fixing, division of markets,
pends oo whether It is an unreasonable group boycotts, and tying arrangements.
restraint <* trade Board qf Trade pf City Id Recognition of the per se rule obviates
if Chicago * United Stat** 246 U A 281, the costly and complex litigation a complete
18 S.Ot £42, tt LEd. Ctt (1818), to CW- role of reason inquiry entails. At; me also
« * » Board of Trad* the United States Northwest Wholesale Stationer* Inc. %
Supreme pomt established the "rale of Pacific Stationery and Printing Cat 472
Itasot" standard to determine whether a U-S. 284, 1P4 S.Ct 2613, 8$ LEdJd 802
(1885).
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III Although there » a "marked lack of
uniformity"f among the federal courta in
defining the term group boycott, a elaatic
per ae group boycott exists where two or
more competitors on the same level of the
market structure agree to eliminate a target horixontal competitor by combining to
deny the target of elements needed in order to compete.
Federal Maritime
Common % Aktiebolaget Svenska Amerika Unien, 890 U-S. 238, 250, 88 S.CL 1005,
101% 19 U3cL2d 1071 (1968); United
State* * General Motor* Corp., 884 U.S.
127,140,86 S.CL 1821,1827-28,16 LEd.2d
415 (1966); Klor% Inc. % Broadway-Hale
Store*, /*&, 859 VS. 207,212,79 S.Ct 705,
709, t LJA2d 741 (1959). See also L
SuHivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust 280 (1977). The restraining agreement need not "entirely exclude its victims
from the market," but only "[prevent
them] from making free choices between
market alternatives...." Associated Gen.
Contractor* ef California, Inc. si California State Council of Carpenter*, 459 VS.
519, 528,10S S.CL 897,90S, 74 LE<L2d 728
(1988). It is the horixontal effect of a
group boycott, a "naked [restraint] of trade
with no purpose except stifling of competition,9' which typically warrants application
of per ae illegality. White Motor Co v.
United State*. 872 VS. 258, 268, 88 S C t
696, 702, 9 UE&2d 788 0963).
Vertical nonprice restraints, Le., combinations of persons at different levels of the
market structure, are generally not treated
under the per ae doctrine but are examined
under the jrule of reason standard. Continental I K , Inc. % GTE Sylvania /»&,
488 VS. 86, 97 &Ct 2549, 53 LEdL2d 568
0977). As the United States Supreme
Court has explained:
We do not know enough of the economic
and business stuff out of which these
arrangements emerge to. be certain.
U * y may be too dangerous to sanction
or they may be allowable protections
* J W J t r v * I f i v f i « * K € k « A*v*438
4 1 * Sit, Ml* 96 *CL &2X 2930, 57 LfidJd
1SUI7D.
8.
Uc***rm*&*$U*mmAam<*V*kA**r
m * Act 'sttcapts la provide both tfct ptsssss

against aggressive competitors or the
only practicable means a small company
has for breaking into or staying in business and within the "rule of reason."
We need to know more than we do about
the actual impact of these arrangements
on competition to decide whether they
have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack . . . any redeeming virtue/'
White Motor Co^ VIZ VS. at 263, 83 S.Ct
at 702 (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 UJ5.
at 5,78 S.Ct at 518) (citations omitted). In
Continental T.V., the Court further explains that whQe "[v]ertical restrictions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting the
number of sellers of a particular product
competing for the business of a given
group of buyers . . . , [they also] promote
interbrand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his products."
483 VS. at 54, 97 S.Ct at 2560.
Under the Sherman Act, both classic
group boycotts and vertical restraints determined unreasonable are subject to criminal penalties. Section 1 of the Sherman
Act provides:
Every person who shall make any eontract or engage in any combination or
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and,
on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars
if a corporation, or, if any other person,
one hundred thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or
by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court
16] Section 76-10-920 of the Utah Antitrust Act, however, criminalises only the
four types of conduct that have been clear
\j labeled as per se violations of the Sherman Act 1 The rale of reason analysis has
no part in the criminal provisions of the
Utah Antitrust Act Therefore, unless defendants9 conduct was in the form of a
lor and the community si terse wfeh s dear
definition of whst nMHfr— Is rriminslrj proscribed."
S.lXbbU*S.)*niiix,Th*UMhAnh
mat Ad *f 1979: Get*** boo The SUM Amxi
Ww* Bkutntm. 1990 Uu* Clev. TS. 83.
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group boycott; it was not criminal under (1978). In the instant case, defendants,
Utah law.
through bribes, enlisted Fletcher to refuse
"The instant case it not a classic group any bids from their competitors, the tarboycott Tht prosecution claims this is an gets of the boycott A group boycott unarrangement between a group of horizontal der the Utah Antitrust Act requires at
competitors, Le., tbe three defendants. At least two conspirators, but neither the
DO time, however, did any two of defend- number of boycotters nor their market reants co-exist as competitors. Rather, they lationship with the target is determinative
were successive owners of the same securi- of criminal liability. Rather, the intent of
ty guard company, albeit the company had the contract, combination, or conspiracy is
different names under different owners. tbe deciding element
Therefore, the alleged agreement between
The dissent proposes an alternative interdefendants and Fletcher did not constitute pretation of section 76-10-920, suggesting
a classic group boycott under the federal the specific anticompetitive intent element
definition.
is intended to narrow the scope of the
However, the group boycott specified in federal definition of a classic group boysection 76-10-920 is not the classic group cott The dissent also suggests the majoriboycott recognized by federal courts. Un- ty opinion fails to consider9 the anticompetider the classic (per se) group boycott defini- tive effect of defendants actions in the
tion, proof of intent and/or effect is not relevant marketplace. In essence, the disrequired, but it is conclusively presumed sent suggests we adopt the classic per se
tbe boycott is anticompetitive and in viola- definition of group boycott but that we use
tion of antitrust laws. Northern Pacific, the rule of reason in evaluating the ele856 VS. at 6, 78 S.Ot at 518. Under ments of proof. Federal courts have consection 76-10-920, tbe prosecution is re- sistently held that classic group boycotts
quired ID prove a defendant engaged in a include, by definition, the elements of antigroup boycott "with [the] specific intent competitive intent and effect in the releofeliminating competition." When inter- vant marketplace. Sec National Collegipreting a statute, we assume the legisla- ate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents of
ture used each term advisedly and in its Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85, 108-104,
proper sense. Home v. Borne, 787 P2d 104 S.Ct 2948, 2961, 82 LEdAi 70 (1984)
144, 847 (Utah App.1987); State * Fmnk- C'Per se rules are invoked when surround**, 786 PJU 84, 87 (Utah 1887). We con- ing circumstances make the likelihood of
strue the statute "on the assumption . . . anticompetitive conduct so great as to renthat the intent of the Legislature is re* der unjustified further examination of the
vealed ia the use ef the term in the context challenged conduct"). It makes no sense
syrf s t r e a m which Misplaced." Ward to adopt tbe daaaic per se definition of
ft Sic\/UU OU* 714 PJd 266, 866 (Utah group boycott and then to require proof of
1864). Btj rsquiring a separate element of anticompetitive intent and market effect
*frpactfk Jntent of shmmating competition," We therefore cannot accept the dissent's
the kgklature dearly did not adopt the interpretation of section 76-10-820.
daaaic group boycott definition formulated
I8J Our interpretation of the Utah Antit v the federal coota.
trust Act is in line with a current trend in
If 1 the tana grovp boycott a* used by federal case law to focus not on the form
Iks Utah state legislature mors closely re- of the conspiracy, but on the intent of the
sembles ttte general defmhioa of boycott conspirators. Ia Continental T.VH the
*fc N t h s d t f pressuring a party with United States Supreme Court, after estabwhet* cos has a dispute by withholding, or lishing the rule of reason analysis aa the
others to withhold, patronage or general standard for vertical restraints,
frwathstarfst"
SLPnutnre* stated "we do not foreclose tbe possibility
Asa €k a Jbrvft OB U A 681, that particular applications ff vertical reSO, 68 l O t 6888. 8868, i t LMUi 868 strictions might justify jwrr #t iroybWotL"
OaUM7SI PJUI es(UufcAn>.
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483 U A at 68, 97 S.CL at 2SS2. Increasingly, federal courtt are recognizing per ae
group boycotts between a single horizontal
competitor and a vertically related company. See Cascade Cabinet Co. * Western
Cabinet and Millwork, 710 FM 1866 (9th
Gr.1983); Corn-Tel, Inc. * DuKdne Corp.,
669 F i d 404 (6th Cir.1982); Corey % Look,
641 ¥M 82 (1st Or.1981). Sec alec Sullivan, Antitrust, at 281 n. 1; Decker, The
Numeroeity Requirement For Group
Boycott* Toward a Horizontal Benefit
Analysis, 18 U£.F.LRev. 677 (1984);
Bauer, Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal- A Rule Ripe for Reexamination. 79 ColumXJtev. 689 (1979). Ttxae
cases and commentators urge that when
applying the per se rule to a group boycott,
the key inquiries should not be the number
or nature of the conspirators, but their
intent and/or the effect of the restraint on
competition. No logic supports ignoring
defendants' anticompetitive conduct in the
instant case solely because they failed to
recruit a second horizontal competitor into
their conspiracy. See Decker, The Numer*
oeity Requirement, 18 U&F.LRev. at 687
CW * single firm has the necessary influence to effectuate an exclusionary boycott
with a supplier or customer, such conduct
should not escape the per ee rule simply
because that firm did not combine with
Others at its own market level to exert its
influence."). Although the coercive pressure was applied vertically, the stifling of
competition was borixontaL Corn-Tel,
/*&, 669 PJd at 409. A conspiracy b the
form of a froup boycott was therefore
rtabGebed.
(C)
(9,111 Under our interpretation of sec* M 76-10-914 and -920, therefore, the
group boycott involving defendants and
^^stcnor V^OIUQ no criminal anon a nroner
atoning of a tptrfffc intent to *»-**-«*»
competition. When the specific intewt of a
defendant k an clems* of the criminal
offense cfcarged, the intent auiy be Inferred
from the defendant; s conduct and anrroundbg cbtnmstaneee. Stale * Fowler,
746PJd472,476(Utah App.l987k State*.
Kenned* Hi PJd 0M, M j W t o b 1 M *

In the instant case, not one of the contracts
between UP & L and defendants was competitively bid. Representatives of other
large companies testified the usual course
of action when selecting a security guard
company is open bidding. Several representatives of other security guard companies testified their attempts to submit bid
proposals to Fletcher were either refused
or ignored. Sufficient evidence wss
presented to the jury to infer s specific
intent of eliminating competition on the
part of defendants. The third element of
the offense was clearly established.
We bold defendants were properly
charged with engaging in a criminal group
boycott under sections 76-10-914 and -920.
Under our interpretation of the Utah Antitrust Act, an individual is clearly on notice
that if he (or she) engages in a contract,
combination, or conspiracy in restraint of
trade, with the specific intent of eliminating competition, regardless of who his coconspirators are, be will be criminally bar
We.
Because there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, to support every
element of the jury's verdict, we will not
disturb it on appeal. State v. Garcia, 744
PJd 1029 (Utah App.1987). Defendants'
convictions on the antitrust counts are affirmed.
Racketeering and "Pattern" of Activity
Defendants argue they were improperly
charged with and convicted of conduct in
violation of the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act, Utah
Code Ann. H 76-KMC01 through -1606
0961) (the RICE Act). When this case was
tried, section 76-10-1908(1) provided:
It shall be unlawful for any person who
has received any proceeds derived,
whether directly or indirectly, from a
pattern of racketeering activity in which
such person has participated, aa a principal, to nee or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such proceeds, or the
proceeds derived from the investment or
use thereof, in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation e l any enterprise
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A "pattern of racketeering activity" was vague. Vagueness it a question of procedefined in aection 76-10-1602(4) M:
dur»j due process, namely "whether the
engaging b at least two episode* of statute adequately notices the proscribed
racketeering conduct which have the con<jUct." State ». Frampton, 787 P.2d
same or similar objectives, results, par- 18a, 192 (Utah 1987). Defendants claim
tkipanta, victims, or methods of oommis- wi'U,out requiring that the conduct prosion. or are otherwise interrelated by dis- scribed demonstrate characteristics traditinguishing characteristics and are not tioudiy associated with organized crime,
isolated events, provided at least one of the R I C E Act does not specifically define
such episodes occurred after the effec- for persons of ordinary intelligence the outlive date of this part and the last of er perimeter of acceptable conduct State
which occurred within five years after 9. Ovens, 688 P.2d 1182,1183 (Utah 1981).
the commission of a prior episode of T * R I C E A c t proscribes the use of proracketeering conduct*
ceefe derived from a pattern of racketeerViolation of the RICE Act is a second de- ing activity in an enterprise. Under the
gree felony punishable by op to 16 years statute, "enterprise," "racketeering actrriimprisooment, a fine of $10,000, and forfei- ty,* ^ d "pattern of racketeering activity"
tore of all jwoperfcr associated with the are ^j dearij defined. "Episode" is deracketeering enterprise.
fined
in Utah Code Ann. ( 76-1-401 (1978).
Defendants first contend the RICE Act, W e hold that the RICE Act is "sufficiently
patterned after the federal Racketeer la-' e l i c i t to inform the ordinary reader what
flaenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 CODth>ct « prohibited," and is therefore not
U.S.C. H 1961 through 1968 (1984) (the unconstitutionally vague. StaU v. TkeoRICO Act), was enacted to prevent the ***% 646 P2A 60, 61 (Utah 1982).
•filtration of organised crime into Utah.
Under section 76-10-1602(l)(h), bribery
Therefore, defendants argue, the RICE Act was included as an act of racketeering,
should extend only to ease* involving of- sometimes referred to as a predicate act*
fosses committed by organised crime.
Defendants argue that using commercial
t i l ) Although tfte legislative histories ^"^ery, a class B misdemeanor punishable
of both the RICE and RICO Acta suggest h7 *p to six months in jail and a fine of up
they were intended to apply to persons to 1299, to satisfy the RICE Act requireeagaged ss acts traditionally associated toSM of predicate offenses violates the eonwith organised crime, a nexus to organised stit^tional restraint against disproportioncrime was not fadoded as an element of *te punishment In reviewing a daim of
the offense. Tbe United 8tates Supreme disproportionate punishment the question
Court concluded that the RICO Act apphas » Nrhether the sentence imposed in proto "aay person" who engages ia eooduet portion to the offense committed is such as
flat Act forbids. SeOma, &PJLL «. /as- to shock the moral sense of aD reasonable
MC Co, #**, *78 UA. 479, 106 8-Ct 8276, men, as to what » right and proper under
8286, 87 Ll&2d 846 (1*85). Simfiariy, we the ettTamataiMea.M StaU v. Hanson, 627
hold Utah's RICE Act is not Bnrftod ID P-ty 58, 66 (Utah 1981) (quoting StaU v.
application to person afffieted with org*- Na*u$, 20 Utah 2d 872, 4S8 PJd 642, 644
assedcrisa*.
<««8)).
I l l ] D*feodants eootend that not feahV (If) Defendants' argument ignores the
ing app&atioa of the RICE Act to serious additional elements required under the
and aggravated offenses by organised I I C E Act, Le, a pattern of racketeering
crime renders the Act ancoostitationally activity, existence of an enterprise, and ase
* Utm,^tjmyt/$htjdt
sAsjastjsBv r» 1 W « U l « « 7 revwJoa. sxtJoa M-10-IM2
i f f i t r v T ^ i ^ r *?n?^ H ^ J r ^ ? ?
**• *"•» * e »«v«ral statutory Qrpcs of bribery
J!.*£!?*H1**'.y . *y ?*?r ***
sMh4duaB>.tedudiagcomment bribery ssv
y ^ r T s ^ i C Z e s T ^ l ™ 1 ™ acawt4%«ctte«ffS Ml.
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of proceeds derived from the racketeering
activity to establish, acquire, or operate the
enterprise. Defendants claim these elements are illusory. We disagree. It is not
the commercial briberies that are being
punished in the present case, but the broader conduct which is forbidden by the RICE
Act Qf. United Stat* % Field, 482
F.Supp. 56 (S.DJt.Y.1977), qffd 578 FAI
1871 (2nd Gr.1978), Ctrl dismissed, 489
VS. 801, 99 S.Ct 48, 58 LEd.2d 94 (1978)
(Congress entitled to make pattern of racketeering an independent criminal offense
punishable more severely than simply twice
the penalty for each constituent offense).
We do not find defendants9 sentences for
the RICE violations unconstitutionally
"shoeing."
Defendants also argue the use of misdemeanors as predicate acts under the RICE
Act k inconsistent with Utah's habitual
criminal statute, Utah Code Ann.
| 76-&-1001 0978), and the enhancement
prorooii of the Utah Controlled Substances
Act,
Utah
Code
Ann.
| 58^7-^UXbXiiD 0987). Under section
76-8-1001, upon proof that a person has
been twice convicted, sentenced, and committed for a felony, one of which is at least
of the second degree, the person may be
sentenced as a habitual criminal for a period of five years to Mfe. Under section
6^S7-80XbXm), upon a second conviction
for production or distribution of a eontrolled substance, a class A misdemeanor, a
parson is guilty of a third degree felony.
114] The RICE Act is not inconsistent
wftfe these criminal provisions. The RICE
Act does not simply punish multiple viohv
t, if VSJL | 1*1(5) defines -pattern of rack*
leering activity* as *m least two ecu of racksleering actfvto....* This definition has bssn
Ihc subject of considerable Judicial attention
foOowtagthe landmark United States Supreme
Court dedsioa in S a t o * &PJLL * Imnx Ga,
* ^ 473 U * 479, tOSSXt 1273, *7LAUd*44
(1905). la fas now famous footnote 14, the
Court noted the fact of mdftdty la the federal
definition «* pattern ef racketeering activity.
After a brief dbcussion of ingestions fta Ike
Isgirfcrln kblorythat'Wicni" connotes Toonti-

tions of statutes prohibiting the acts enumerated in section 76-10-1602(1). Instead,
the RICE Act punishes participation in a
pattern of racketeering activity bearing the
required relationship to an enterprise. See
subsections 76-10-1603(1) through (4).
Finally, defendants argue the evidence at
trial failed to establish a pattern of racketeering activity. "Pattern of racketeering
activity" was defined in section 76-101602(4) as "at least two episodes of racketeering conduct which have the same or
similar objectives, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are
otherwise interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not isolated
events
" Defendants claim the several
counts of bribery of which they were convicted were, as a matter of law, part of
only a single episode of racketeering conduct and thus cannot establish a pattern.
In support of their argument, defendants
cite several federal cases involving civil
claims under the RICO Act The federal
definition of a pattern of racketeering activity differs significantly from the definition of the aame term in section 76-101602(4).' Federal cases which elaborate on
the federal definition of "pattern of racketeering activity** are, however, helpful in
our analysis.
Federal case law after Sedima has attempted judicially to refine the definition of
"pattern of racketeering activity" of the
RICO Act Those cases have emphaaized
the concepts of "continuity plus relatedneea** discussed in Sedimci Against this
backdrop, some federal courts have fashioned requirements that there be "multiple
enlightening: "criminal conduct forms a pattern If h embraces criminal acts that have the
esmc or similar purposes* results, parbripants* victim*, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing
characteristics and are not Isolated events."
II V&JC | 1575(e). This language stay be
useful la interpreting other sections of the
Act
105 &Ct at 5215. The pattern definition noted
by the Supreme Court is substantislly identical
lo the definition contained in the MCE Act
Thus* the pattern analysis under the RICE Act
docs not opgate from the same sparse ianguajt
af the RICO Act
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schemes" or "multiple criminal episodes" ed in time and is incident to an attempt or
rather than aeverml acts to accomplish a an accomplishment of a single criminal obtingle criminal objective in order to estab- jective." The trial court instructed the
lish a pattern of racketeering activity.
Jury as follows:
The case of Torwest DfiC, Inc. v. Dick,
If you should find one or more of the
628 RSupp 16S (D.Cok>.1986), cited by dedefendants guilty of bribery, you must
fendants, alleged multiple acts of mail/wire
then determine whether the seven identifraud in connection with a single scheme to
fied payments constitute seven separate
defraud The district court held that no
bribes, or a series of payments on a
pattern existed where the defendants' consingle bribe. If you find beyond a readuct had a single purpose, a tingle result,
sonable doubt that each of the payments
one set of participants, a single victim, and
was made with a distinct and separate
ooe method of commission. The district
purpose, then there are separate bribes.
court thus concluded there was "no contiOn the other hand, if the evidence does
nuity and, therefore, no pattern of rackenot convince you beyond a reasonable
teering activity." Id. at 166. The Tenth
doubt that the payments were made with
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, but difdifferent purposes, then such payments
ferentiated the case from one where "the
constitute one bribe.
RICO claim is based on one scheme involvDefendants argue the seven payments
ing ooe victim, but the plan contemplates
were in furtherance of a single criminal
open-ended fraudulent activity and does not
objective and therefore constituted a single
have a single goal that, when achieved, will
episode. Determining the existence of a
bring the activity to an end" Torwest
single offense or multiple offenses is a
DBQ Inc. w. Dick, 810 ?M 925, 929 (10th
question of intent to be determined by the
Or.1967). Other federal courts have noted
particular facts and circumstances of each
that an ongoing scheme involving the same
case State v. KimbeU 620 P-2d 615, 518
perpetrators, victims, and method of com(Utah 1980). Although the overall scheme
mission may in itself demonstrate a suffiwas to maintain defendants9 exclusive concient pattern of racketeering activity. See
tract with UP k L, there was evidence to
Thompson * Wyoming Alaska, Inc., 652
support the jury's finding a separate purPAipp. 1222,1227-28 (D.Utah 1987); Tempose for each bribe, Le., Fletcher's hiring of
poraries, Inc. 9. Maryland National
defendants' company before execution of a
Bank. C88 FSupp. 118, 128 (D.Mdl966)
contract, his recommendations to UP k L
("A more flexible and accurate approach to
management, and his refusal to consider
identifying patterns may be to require eiother bids. The fact the jury convicted
ther 1) more than ooe scheme or 2) an
defendants on only five of the seven bribopen-ended continuous scheme which eonery counts indicates they considered the
tains a muhiplidty of predicate acta.").
facts and circumstances of each payment
[ 1 M Q We conclude the RICE Act's individually and made a determination as to
definition of pattern requires separate but each. As there to evidence to support the
related criminal eptsodee as the bask for a jury's findings, we will not disturb them on
patten. We also conclude that the facts of appeal Garcia, 744 P M at 1090.
the (Bate before us satisfy the requirement
Defendants* convictions of violations of
of separate but related criminal episodes
the RICE Act are affirmed.
suggested by (he federal cases and implicit
fe thf dfffaftfrn of pattwa ef farfcftmfag MiMOcllanoous Imum
activity contained b section 7040-1«02(4).
Defendants also argue their bribery conDefendants were each charged with seven victions should be reversed because the
Afferent bribes paid in approximately two trial court erred in not instructing the jury
Wfek intervale between February and May that aa Blegal bribe must be paid with
Sftt. Aa episode to * s V < * ***** TO- criminal intent Die trial cou/t instructed
IrdOl aa <W conduct wtuch to doecty relet the JuQr as follows:
Ck«w79l TXi
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Before you can convict any defendant for
bribery you mutt find beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the
following elements:
(1) That the defendant or defendants in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
(2) On or about the date or dates alleged
in the Information;
(8) That the defendant or defendants
conferred, offered or agreed to confer
upon L Brent Fletcher a benefit;
(4) That this benefit was conferred or
offered with the purpose of influencing
the conduct of Mr. Fletcher in relating to
the affairs of Utah Power and light
contrary to the interest* of Utah Power
and Light and without its consent;
(6) That the defendant or defendants offered or conferred or agreed to confer
the benefits, if any, knowingly, intentionally or willfully as those terms are defined in these instructions.
117] We believe the instruction sufficiently advised the jury on the law. Both
the statute and the instruction implicitly
require a criminal intent by requiring a
showing of conduct contrary to the inter*
eats of and without the consent of the
employer or principal. See State v.
OWeiH 108 Washed 853, 700 P.2d 711
(1985). Defendants' convictions of bribery
are affirmed.
Defendants next argue the trial court
made prejudicial errors in the admission of
certain evidence. Even assnming the trial
court did err9 defendants have failed to
show the challenged evidence had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict. Therefore* the errors, if any, wire
not prejudicial. Utah RXvid. 108; State *
Velarde, T84 PAI 440, 448 (Utah 1986).
Finally, defendants argue the trial count
erred fe not granting a mistrial after two
witnesses mentioned the Fletcher trial and
one juror told the court she had read of
Fletcher's conviction h the newspaper during the trial Wkh regard to motions for
mistrial theUt*h Supreme Court has statr
The critical inquiry should be whether
there is a reasonable UkeBhood that the
faddent so prejudiced the jury that fa Its

absence there might have been a different result Due to his advantaged position and consistent with his responsibilities as the authority in charge of the
trial, the inquiry is necessarily addressed
to the sound discretion of the trial court
He should view such an episode in the
light of the total proceeding, and if he
thinks that there has been such prejudice
that there is a reasonable probability
that the defendant cannot have a fair and
impartial determination of his guilt or
innocence, he should of course grant a
mistrial. But inasmuch as this is his
primary responsibility, when he has given due consideration and ruled upon the
matter, this court on review should not
upset his ruling unless it clearly appears
that he has abused his discretion.
State v. Hodges, 80 Utah 2d 867, 517 P.2d
1822, 1824 (1974) (footnote omitted).
[18] Defendants have failed to show
any clear abuse of the trial court's discretion. The trial court and counsel both
questioned the juror. The juror indicated
the fact of Fletcher's conviction had no
impact on her deliberation* and was not
discussed with the other jury members.
Furthermore, the trial court adequately instructed the jury to only consider the evidence introduced at trial. The denial of
defendants9 motion for a mistrial is affirmed.
The jury verdict on all counts is affirmed.
DAVIDSON, J., concurs.
ORME, Judge (dissenting in part):
While I otherwise fully concur m the
majority opinion, I disagree with the result
reached and portions of the analysis in the
section entitled "Antitrust and 'Group BoyGOVT.

As the majority states, there are three
elements of the antitrust offense as
charged in this case: (1) a contract, combination or conspiracy tn restraint of trade;
(2) in the form of a group boycott; and (8)
with specific intent to eliminate competition. I sfanply do not believe that these
elements have been met Ifytifeagreement
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with my colleagues » quite complete. I
believe defendant!9 conduct constituted
simple commercial bribery. I believe their
conduct can in no way be properly characterized as a group boycott I believe the
evidence shows defendants' intent was
strictly to line their own pockets and not, in
any sense, to eliminate competition.

COMMERCIAL BRIBERY
I do not view Utah's antitrust statute as
the appropriate vehicle for bringing commercial bribery charges* In addressing
this issue, the trial court properly recognized the Robinson-Patman Act as the vehicle under which federal commercial bribery charges are typically brought1 The
court interpreted the Legislature's failure
to incorporate a Robinson-Patman Act as
evidencing an intent to make Utah's antitrust statute the appropriate vehicle for
charging commercial bribery. I believe the
fairer interpretation m that the Legislature
deliberately faOed to incorporate tike Robinsoo-Pstman-type act into our antitrust statr
vie because it recognized that Utah already
has a specific vehicle for prosecuting commercial bribery, namely the commercial
bribery statute.
Utah Code Ann.
| Tfr4~fi08 (Wty.
Even assuming that commercial bribery
is properly charged under the Utah antitrust statute, the majority concedes the
bribery must be coupled with other nets
intended to restrain bade in order to establish a violation. WhOs the majority recognise* the priadple that commercial briery,
without a m , does not violate the antitrust

ment necessarily involves the exclusion of
an entity which operates on the same market level). At least absent evidence of
other Olegal conduct, the defendants' payment of bribes did not constitute a contract, combination, or conspiracy in violation of the antitrust statute. Fletcher's
rrfitMil !<> engage the services of defendants' competitors was merely the bargained
for object of the bribes in question. Under
the majority's view—notwithstanding the
claim that more than a typical commercial
bribe is required-—essentially every commercial bribe would be an antitrust violation if only the payee performed his or her
end of the bargain.

GROUP BOYCOTT
As the majority observes, under
| 76-10-920 of the Utah Antitrust Act,
only four specific antitrust violations,
"clearly labeled as per se violations of the
Sherman Act," are criminal offenses in
Utah. Defendants in this case were
charged with having committed only one
such violation, namely a group boycott As
the majority states, the Legislature intended that federal interpretations be considered in construing the Utah statute
where appropriate. However, unlike with
the Sherman Act, the Utah statute was
designed to unambiguously define antitrust
violations which will give rise to criminal
sanctions in this state. See Dibble ft Jardine, Ths Utah Antitrust Act of 1*7* Getting Into the Stats Antitrust Businss*,
1980 Utah URev. 78, 83. The majority
concedes that the agreement between defendants and Fletcher did not constitute a
refusal to accept proposals from other se- elastic group boycott under the federal defcurity companies m the "ewrt" which is inition and that "unless defendants' eonnecessary to tun an otherwise gardao-vari- duct was in the form of a group boycott, it
ety tet* into aa aatitz^ vioktkm. Bow- was not criminal under Utah law.*
ever, i*y acreemaot to deal exclusively
Notwithstanding the specific language of
wkh o*s party neeeaearfy involves a refus- the statute dictating the use of federal
al to deal wfefc ether parties Set, A * , interpretations and the objective of dearly
Construction Aggregate Trans % Florida delineating proscribed conduct, the majoritotk h* h±>nt P J i TO,, T76 01th ty suggests that the Utah statute injects
Q r J W fcwtj « p 4 * t o denl^ armiife- the traditional federal definition of the
, woi% la conaectfaa wtlk a a l t e l foods Uhpal
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term "group boycott" in favor of the "general definition of boycott9' * This concept,
according to the majority, refer* to "a
method of pressuring a party with whom
ooe has a dispute by withholding, or enhstk g others to withhold, patronage or services from the target"* Even under this
definition, H is difficult to imagine how the
behavior of these defendants constitutes
any kind of boycott with antitrust implications. Fletcher accepted bribes from the
defendants in this case so that they would
receive the UP A L security contracts.
Tbert was no dispute, no pressure, DO enlistment of others to withhold services, and
no target for elimination. It is clear to me
that even if the Legislature meant to have
the term "group boycott" construed in a
less rigid way than might characterize the
traditional federal view, it nonetheless intended to have the term mean something
reasonably concrete. Minimally, the behavior sought to be proscribed by the statute
is behavior which can fairly be described as
a group boycott
In my view, what defendants did cannot
be characterized as a group boycott in any
X The majority relies on federal cases rejecting
the "oumcrositY" requirement of group boycott
for die view that something less U now needed
ID constitute a group boycott. While It is true
that these cases have dropped the "numerosity"
requirement, L&, concern about the number of
conspirators In a horizontal relationship, they
nonetheless still require the other elements of a
group boycott: concerted refusal to deal enlistmeat of others* and a target Sse, *£, Cens-fai
Ave «. Oukmm Csrja, 669 T2d «04. 414 (6th
Or.lttt).

sense. Defendants' excursion into the
realm of antitrust was, at most, in the form
of an exclusive dealing arrangement An
exclusive dealing arrangement is a contract
which involves s commitment by s buyer to
deal only with a particular seller. L Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of Antitrust
471 (1977). However, such an arrangement does not constitute a per se violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act, tee, e.g.,
Turin City SporUervice, Inc. r. Charles 0.
Pinley * Co., 676 F.2d 1291,1304 n. 9 (9th
Or. 1982) (explaining Tampa Electric Co. •.
Nashville Coal Co., 865 U.S. 820, 81 S.Ct
623, 5 LEd.2d 580 (1961)), nor does ft constitute a violation of | 76-10-920 of the
Utah Antitrust Act
The trial court accurately categorixed the
arrangement between Fletcher and the defendants in this case as one of "exclusive
dealing," while at the same time stating
that application of "rule of reason9' analysis 4 "would result in an unconstitutional
deprivation of defendant's rights to doe
process of law."1 The majority likewise
actual harm to competition. The purpose of
this test is to determine the anticompetitive "effects" of the exclusive contract, id, rather than
the anticompetitive "intent" as required by the
Utah statute.

S. The memorandum decision Is reprinted at
Note, Oimmat Antitrust Actum m Uimk' Stmt* v.
Afdfcen i B.Y.UJJ>ubX. 229. 251-55 (I9S6).
The decision was written in the context of a
denial of a motion to dismiss. While the decision simply permitted the state to proceed to try
Us case before a Jury, the trial court shared the
& the majority wigsirati that s boycott under
majority's view that intent is the control***
*^ear general oefnBOoar oners from use term
element of a "group boycott" charge.
group boycott ss It evolved under the par as
doctrine. Ironically, their definition was taken
The theme of the cases dted by both parties
from one of the landmark cases defining a per
Is that the mere existence of an exclusive
it'fllegsjtfotm boycott. The definition extractvertical contract is not a "group boycott proad from the Supreme Court's opinion was one
hibited by the antitrust laws. However, the
which tha Court offered ts nqplsts the tsrm
State has alleged and should be allowed so
%oyc**f to common parlatttfc J f c r W J f c t *
prove that the defendants had specific antittMv Am Co. * AWr* 4M VJL 531. 545-46.
competitive intent This can not be inferred
from the mere existence of an exclusive vertim VOL wx am, s? LB*** « (*tm
cal deal but by anticompetitive, illegal behav4 Whereas group boycotts ate subject to a per at
ior an otherwise legal business dedsioo can
turn of Harnlg, eaduatve deaftac atraam>
become aa unlawful group boycott under the
meats art tested bj a Vtfr of reason* standard.
Utah Antitrust Act The State should have the
iWoi City Sports*rvk% Ate. * CksrksCL Rmkj
opportunity to establish mat the defendants
4 < X 6 7 6 r \ 2 d a t l * t t . The focus of this test is
bad a specific Intent to eliminate access to the
lo first find a relevant market and then asanas
security guard market at the goal of their
whether competition has bona forsdosW m a
exdust^t dealing and that no legitimate buti-
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admits that "the rule of reason has no part
in the criminal provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act"
T V majority, however, largely avoids
the implications of this conclusion by minimixing the nature of defendants' behavior
and instead emphasizing their perceived
state of mind in doing what they did. According to the majority, "the intent of the
contract, combination or conspiracy is the
deckling element" of criminality. Under
this reasoning, even a purely vertical exclusive dealing contract—which both the majority and the trial court acknowledge is
not a "group boycott" in the usual sense—
can be miraculously converted into a group
boycott, at least of the Utah variety, by
proof of an anticompetitive intent That is,
as the trial court held, "an otherwise legal
business decision can become an unlawful
group boycott under the Utah Antitrust
Act"
The effect of this approach is to render
totally ineffectual the Legislature's effort
to particularise but four familiar, per se
antitrust violations as unlawful under
| 76-10-920, so that "both the prosecutor
and the community at Jarge" win dearly
know "what conduct is criminally proscribed." Dibble t Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of 1979: Getting Into the State
Antitrust Business, I960 Utah LRev. 78,
» (emphasis added).
But why eke, tM logic goes, would the
Legislature ktject a specific intent requirement into an offense which has historically
bees thought so bad that criminal Intent
can simply be presumed? It is obvious to
jbe that by coupling an anticompetitive ape*
dfic intent requirement with the group
boycott aapeet of ft W-10-*», the LegbbCstre aid not mean to obscure the issue of
feather, the Legislature meant to avoid the
••confusion over the Illegality of group boydB voiced from

_

£ftf
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«K, aiU* * sin. n.vrtxx
M, m uuji see {wn%
B U o w a marl* ejNtjslt * *

**t

ootts and the governing standards/' id, by
requiring that a readily identifiable group
boycott be accompanied by an actual intent
to eliminate competition. See id The specific intent requirement was added to eliminate "the potentially problematic situation
where a group boycott exists but an anticompetitive motive does not" Id T^e
requirement was not added to allow for a
criminal conviction whenever there is an
anticompetitive motive regardless
whether there is really a group boycott 1
believe by adding a specific intent requirement the Legislature meant to narrow, not
expand, the scope of the group boycott
crime in this state.
SPECIFIC INTENT
Even if the defendants engaged in eonduct which might arguably constitute a
group boycott in some broad sense, I do
not believe they did so with the specific
intent to eliminate competition as required
by the statute nor do I agree with the
majority that such intent can be inferred
from the evidence.
According to the majority, anticompetitive intent "may be inferred from the defendant's conduct and circumstances.M
The majority points to the fact that the
contracts between UP 4 L and defendants
were not competitively bid as is the usual
practice in selecting security companies.
This leads my colleagues to the conclusion
that the intent of these defendants was
none otherthan to eliminate "competition."
If ooe looks at what defendants did and
considers the market in which they did ft,*
it is obvious they had no intent to eliminate
competition. Tbt trial court, in instructing
the Jury, narrowly defined the relevant
market in this ease as "among vendors of
security guard services to Utah Power and
Light,- notwithstanding the fact that other
security guard companies competing for
i applying the ruk of
tit It indeed unnecessary where aa
vfotsttoa of thtvf* st variety It at fan
ever, I thus a cursory pecs si tht
•urket It tattnicth* la evahsttiaa the
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the UP ft L contract were also competing
for contracts throughout the state, or even
worldwide. However, there was DO evidence that the security needs of UP 4 L
were somehow so unique that £uard service vendors competing for UP A L's business were necessarily different—and fewer—than guard service vendors generally,
who of course are able to provide security
services for everything from large utilities
to retail stores, apartments, warehouses,
churches, banks, and so on. Nor was there
evidence to show that UP ft L was such a
major purchaser in the local security service market that failure to secure that contract would necessarily imperil any of defendants' competitors.

ants' conduct does not constitute a group
boycott Even if defendants' conduct can
somehow be shoehorned into the "group
boycott" pigeonhole, there was no evidence
to prove a specific intent to eliminate competition, and the fair inferences point the
other way. I would reverse the antitrust
convictions and remand for resentencing on
the other crimes for which defendants were
properly convicted.

(jo !oT»fM«imTiii>

While H can perhaps be inferred that the
defendants intended to eliminate other security companies from competition for the
UP i L contract, it simply cannot be inferred that they intended to eliminate these
companies from competition in any meaningful marketplace, which is what the antitrust laws are designed to prevent T h e
Sherman Act was enacted to protect competition in the marketplace. It was not
designed, and has never been interpreted,
to reach aO business practices, unfair or
otherwise, damaging to individual companies.* Caooade Cabinet Co. * WmUm
Cabin* 4 MiUwork. 710 M d 1M6, 1174
(9th Cir.lMS). Other security companies
were not hindered by defendants in competing for security guard contracts Tb*y
warn merely deprived of the UP * L contract While this conduct is certainly not
fflpiypfn(faille f "the not of unfair
icsiiHing in the substitution of oc
t^c tot another without mors does not violate the antfcrwt lawn."
Man&cturin$
lessor** Corp. t> Grwnlm Tool Go* U S
WM 1017, IMS (Uth O r 4 t t 3 .

Defendant was convicted in the Third
District Court, Salt Lake County, Judith M.
Bflhngm, J., of bribery, violation of state
antitrust law, and racketeering, and be appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bench, J.,
held that application of state Racketeering
Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act to
defendant, based in part on acts committed
prior to enactment of Act, was not ax post
facto application, where at least one predicate offense occurred after enactment of

CONCLUSION
Commercial bribery docs not criminally
vlokte the Utah antitrust lawa. Defend-

Orme, in concurred and filed opinion.

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff a»d
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v.
L. Brent FLETCHER, Defendant
and Appellant
No. 8M35ft-CA.
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sjmnsnsa. ,3hdr punishment, however, should
be for the crimes they committed, not those
<hey might have committed had the Legislature
a din a tut spprotch to <
}ed ftfa* snd msv ^ M M **" * • « • " *

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMEN 1 IV
The right of tlie people to be secure in their persons, honses, .papers.
and effects, aguinst unreasonable .searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants »hall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or tiling to be seized.
AMENDMENT
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a preseuunent or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases amin<{ in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
aetual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the name offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compciled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT V m
Excess!re bail *hall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

AMENDMENTS
TO THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, .papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants *hall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
AMENDMENT V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in
actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person
be subject for the name offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;
nor shall be compciled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor .shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

AMENDMENT V m
Excessive bail Khali not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor
cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

PART 9
TRADE AND COMMERCE
Section

Section

76-10.911. Antitrust Act — Short title
76.10-912. Legislative finding — Purpose ot
act.
76-10-91T Definition*.
76-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities.
76-10 -9 If. Exempt activities.
76-10-916. Attorney itinera!'* power* — Investigation* — Institution of
action> — Cooperation.
76-10-917. Civil antitrust investigations —
Demand for documentary material <»r information — Production of document* — Oral exami nation — Judicial order for
compliance — Confidfntiality
— Suln»«-n.u» precluded
76-10-918. Attorney general may brine action tor injuncuve relief, damages or civil penalty
76-10-919. Petxm may bring action for injunctive relief and damages —

Treble damage* — Recovery of
act it \ I damage* or civil penalty
by state or political subdivisions — Immunity of political
subdivisions from damages,
costs, or attorney s fees.
76-10920. Fine and/or imprisonment tor violation — Certain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo conten76-10-921. Conviciion as prima facie evidence in action for injunctive
relief or damages.
76-10-022. Antitrust revolving account.
76-10023. Attorney general to advocate competition.
76-10-924. Venue of action* by
Transfer.
76-l0-,r>5 Statu i* of limitations.
76-10-926. Interpretation ot act.

Law Reviews. — Antitrust Issues Facing
the Ski Resort Industry: The Company Town
Revisited, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 813.

Antitrust Policy and Olympic Athletes: The
United State* Ski Team Goes for the Gold,
2985 Utah L. Rev. 831

76-10-911. Antitrust Act — Short title.
This act shall be known, and may be cited, as the "Utah Antitrust Act."
History: C 1953, 78-10-911, enacted by L.
1979, eh. 79, I 1.
Cross-Refereocea. — Unfair Practices Act,
I 13-5-1 tt seq
Law Reviews. — Forum-Shopping in Appellate Review of FTC Cease and Desist Orders, 1968 Utah L. Rev. 316.
Antitrust Symposium, 1969 Utah L. Rev.
617 et sea
The Utah Antitrust Act of 1979: Getting into

the State Antitrust Business, 1980 Utah L
Rev. 73.
A.L.R. — Propriety, under state law, of
manufacturer's or supplier's refusal to sell
medical product to individual physician, hospital, or clinic, 45 A L R 4th 1007.

76-10-912. Legislative findings — Purpose of act
The legislature Finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the
free market system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest
prices, the highest quality and the greatest material progress, while at the
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our
democratic, political and social institutions.
The purpose of this act is, therefore, to encourage free and open competition
in the interest of the general welfare and economy of this state by prohibiting
monopolistic and unfair trade practices, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce and by providing adequate penalties for the
enforcement of its provisions.
History: C. 1969, 76-10-912, enacted by L.
1979, eh. 79, t 2.

76-10-913. Definitions.
As used in this act:
(1) "Attempt to monopolize" means action taken without a legitimate
business purpose and with a specific intent of destroying competition or
controlling prices to substantially lessen competition, or creating a monopoly, where there is a dangerous probability of creating a monopoly.
(2) "Commodity" includes any product of the soil, any article of merchandise or trade or commerce, and any other kind of real or personal
property.
(3) "Manufacturer" means the producer or originator of any commodity
or service.
(4) "Service" includes any activity that is performed in whole or in part
for the purpose of financial gain including, but not limited to, personal
service, professional service, rental, leasing or licensing for use.
(6) "Trade or commerce" includes all economic activity involving, or
relating to, any commodity, service, or business activity, including the
coat of exchange or transportation.

History: C. 19S3. 76-10-913, enacted by U
1979, ch. 79, I S.

76-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities.
(1) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal.
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize,
any part of trade or commerce.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-914, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79, I 4.
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
ANALYSIS

Agricultural cooperative association.
Illegal price-control agreement of trade corporation.
Proof of violation.
Agricultural cooperative association.
Suit by milk hauler agsinst producers' association raised question for jury whether asaociation had urged members to use only it* transportation services to further iu own legitimate
business intereaU or U> enable it to fu minimum milk prices, such conduct would be just;.
fiable if for the former purpose, but unlawful if
for the latter purpose. Gammon v. Federated

Milk ^toJEZiim*

of information for bidding — and where the fee
paid by the members was graduated upward
based on the total bid by a member on a job,
t n d where the fee was understood to be in addition to the actual job cost with the purpose in
nind of carrying out an investment program
f o r ^ n^b*,, mnd p ^ g dividends, the
^^^^ b e t w e e n ^ corporation and the
- . ^ ^ _,.. ._ :ii*«.» ~w^-«**-o

|« U U »l. 883 E f ^ "

Regal price-control agreement of trade
corporationWhere a group of contractors organised a
profit corporation which was to provide esaential information involving the economics of
their trade and included an agreement to em*
ploy a common agent to provide one essential
service in bidding each J o b - a common source

^^r^TTf

trade and invalid as against public policy.
Zion's Service Corp. v. Danielaon (1961) 12 U
2d 369, 366 P 2d 982.
Proof of violation.
Proof of combine, conspiracy or agreement
was necessary to eatabliah violation of former
law. Flinco, Inc. v. Goodyear Tire sV Rubber Co.
(1965) 17 U 2d 173. 406 P 2d 911.

76*10-915. Exempt activities.
(1) No provision of this act shall be construed to prohibit:
(a) The activities of any public utility to the extent that those activities
are subject to regulation by the public service commission, the state or
federal department of transportation, the federal energy regulatory commission, the federal communications commission, the interstate commerce commission, or successor agencies;
(b) The activities of any insurer, insurance agent, insurance broker,
independent insurance adjuster or rating organization including, but not
limited to, making or participating in joint underwriting or reinsurance
arrangements, to the extent that those activities are subject to regulation
hv the commissioner of insurance;

(c) The activities of securities dealers, issuers or agents, to the extent
that those activities are subject to regulation under the laws of either this
state or the United States;
(d) The activities of any state or national banking institution, to the
extent that such activities are regulated or supervised by state government officers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or by federal government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the
United States;
(e) The activities of any state or federal savings and loan association to
the extent that those activities are regulated or supervised by state government officers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or federal government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the
United States; or
(f) The activities of a municipality to the extent authorized or directed
by state law.
(2) The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce.
Nothing contained in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purpose of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate object thereof; nor shall such organisations or membership in them be held to be illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade under the antitrust laws.
Hlftory: C. IMS.76-10-9IS, enacted by L.
irn, ch. 7t, i ».

76-10-916. Attorney general's powers — Investigations —
Institution of actions — Cooperation.
(1) The attorney general shall have authority to investigate suspected violations of this act and to institute appropriate actions regarding those suspected violations as provided in this act.
(2) Any violations of this act which may come to the attention of any state
government officer or agency shall be reported to the attorney general. All
state government officers and agencies shall cooperate with, and assist in, any
prosecution for violation of this act.
(3) The attorney general shall have the authority to proceed under any
antitrust laws in the federal courts on behalf of this state or any of its political
subdivisions or agencies.
Mialorr C. 1S63, Tf-10-ilt, enacted by I*

lf?t, cfc. I t , • C

76-10-917. Civil antitrust investigations — Demand for
documentary material or information — Production of documents — Oral examination — Judicial order for compliance — Confidentiality —
Subpoenas precluded.
(1) Whenever the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material,
or may have any information relevant to a civil antitrust investigation, he
may, prior to the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, issue and cause to
be served upon that person a written civil investigative demand requesting
that person to produce such documentary material for inspection, copying or
reproduction by the state where the documents are located or produced, to
give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to
furnish any combination thereof.
(2) (a) Each such demand shall state:
(i) The nature of the activities constituting the alleged antitrust
violation or the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition,
joint venture, or similar transaction which, if consummated, may
result in a violation of this act which are under investigation and the
provision of law applicable thereto; and
(ii) That the recipient is entitled to counsel, that the documents,
materials, or testimony in response to the demand may be used in a
civil or criminal proceeding, and that if the recipient does not comply
with the demand the office of the attorney general may compel compliance by appearance, upon reasonable notice to the recipient, before
the district court in the judicial district wherein the recipient resides
or does business and only upon a showing before that district court
that the requirements of subsection (7) have been met.
(b) If the demand is one for production of documentary material, it
shall also:
(i) Describe the classes of documentary material to be produced
thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit the
material to be fairly identified;
(ii) Prescribe return dates which will provide a reasonable period
of time within which the material demanded may be assembled and
made available for inspection and reproduction; and
(iii) Identify the individual at the attorney general's office to
whom such material shall be made available.
(c) If the demand is one for the giving of oral testimony, it shall also
prescribe the date, time and place at which oral testimony shall be commenced and state that a member of the attorney general's office staff shall
conduct the examination and that a copy of the transcript of such examination shall be submitted to and maintained by the office of the attorney
general.
(3) The civil investigative demand may be served upon any person who may
be brought within the jurisdiction of any Utah oourt and shall be served upon
the person in the manner provided for service of a subpoena.
(4) The production of documentary material in response to a demand served
pursuant to this section shall be made under an affidavit, in such form as the

demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is
directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons having knowledge
of the facts and circumstances relating to such production, to the effect that
all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the possession, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has in
good faith been produced and made available to the office of the attorney
general.
(5) (a) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral testimony served under this section shall be taken before an officer authorized
to administer oaths or affirmations by the laws of the United States or of
the place where the examination is held. The officer before whom the
testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or affirmation and
shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his
presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be
taken stenographically and transcribed. The officer before whom the testimony is taken shall promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the
testimony to the office of the attorney general.
(b) In the taking of oral testimony, all persons other than personnel
from the attorney general's office, the witness, counsel for the witness,
the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any stenographer taking such testimony, shall be excluded from the place where the
examination is held.
(c) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand
served under this section shall be taken in the county wherein such person resides or transacts business or in such other place as may be agreed
upon by the attorney general and such person.
(d) When testimony is fully transcribed the transcript shall be certified
by the officer before whom the testimony was taken and submitted to the
witness for examination and signing, in accordance with Rule 30(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the deposition shall be furnished
free of charge to each such witness upon his request.
(e) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony
pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by
counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the
request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to
any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on
the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for
the record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be
Diade, received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such
person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any
constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege
against self-incrimination. If such person refuses to answer any question,
the attorney general may petition the district court for an order compelling such person to answer the question.
(?) If any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony pursuant to this section refuses to answer any questions on grounds
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person
may be compelled as in criminal cases under section 77-45-2.
(g) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand
served under this section shall be entitled to the same fees andT mileage
which are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the State rf Utitb

Witness fees and expenses shall be tendered and paid as in any civil
action.
(6) The providing of any testimony, documents or objects in response to a
civil investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall
be considered part of an official proceeding as defined in section 76-8-501.
(7) If a person objects to, or otherwise fails to comply with the demand
served upon him pursuant to this section, the attorney general may file in the
district court of the county in which the person resides or does business, a
petition for an order compelling compliance with the demand. Notice of hearing of the petition and a copy of the petition shall be served upon the person,
who may appear in opposition to the petition. If the court finds that the
demand is proper, that there is reasonable cause to believe there has been a
violation of this act, and that the information sought or document or object
demanded is relevant to the violation, it shall order the person to comply with
the demand, subject to such modifications as the court may prescribe. Upon
motion by the person and for good cause shown, the court may make any
further order in the proceedings that justice requires to protect the person
from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or expense.
(8) Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced under this section shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless ordered disclosed by the court for good cause shown or confidentiality is waived in writing by the person being investigated or the person who has testified or produced documents or objects.
(9) Use of a civil investigative demand under this action precludes the
invocation by the attorney general of section 77-45-20.
History: C. 1953, 76-10-917, enacted by L.
1979, ch. 79. I 7.
Compiler's Notes. — Section* 77-45-2 and
77-45-20, referred to in Subsections «5xf> and
(9) were repealed in 1980 For similar provi•ions in the present law, see Chapter 32 of Title 77.

Crow-Reference*. — Witness feet and
mileage. *t 21-5-4. 21-5-8. 21-5-10
Law Reviews. — The Utah Antitrust Act of
1979: Getting into the State Antitrust Business. 1980 Utah L. Rev. 73, 88-94.

76-10-918. Attorney general may bring action for injunctive relief, damages or civil penalty.
The attorney general may bring an action for appropriate i injunctive relief,
and for damages or a civil penalty in the name of the state or any of its
political subdivisions or agencies for a violation of this act. The court may
assess for the benefit of the state, a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for
each violation of the Utah Antitrust Act.
History: C. 19&3,70-10-918, enacted by L.
1979, eh. 79, I 8; L. 1984, ch. 19, I 1.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1984 amendment
aubstitulod "and for damages or a civil penahy- for "or damage*-; and added the second
sentence

A.LJL — What constitutes impairment of
proposed intervener's interest to support intervention as matter of right under Rule 24(aM2)
of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in antitrust
actions, 7S A.L.R. Fad. 885.

76-10-919. Person may bring action for injunctive relief
and damages *— Treble damages — Recovery of
actual damages or civil penalty by state or political subdivisions — Immunity of political subdivisions from damages, costs, or attorney's fees.
(1) (a) A person who is injured or is threatened with injury in his business
or property by a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act may bring an action
for injunctive relief and damages.
(b) Subject to the provisions of Subsections (3), (4), and (5), the court
shall award three times the amount of damages sustained, plus the cost of
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee, in addition to granting any appropriate temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relief.
(2) (a) If the court determines that a judgment in the amount of three times
the damages awarded plus attorney's fees and costs will directly cause the
insolvency of the defendant, the court shall reduce the amount of judgment to the highest sum that would not cause the defendant's insolvency.
(b) The court may not reduce a judgment to an amount less than the
amount of damages sustained plus the costs of suit and a reasonable
attorney's fee.
(3) The state or any of its political subdivisions may recover the actual
damages it sustains, or the civil penalty provided by the Utah Antitrust Act,
in addition to injunctive relief, costs of suit, and a reasonable attorney's fee.
(4) No damages, costs, or attorney's fee may be recovered under this section:
(a) from any political subdivision;
(b) from the official or employee of any political subdivision acting in
an official capacity; or
(c) against any person based on any official action directed by a political subdivision or its official or employee acting in an official capacity.
(5) (a) Subsection (4) does not apply to cases filed before April 27, 1987,
unless the defendant establishes and the court determines that in light of
all the circumstances, including the posture of litigation and the availability of alternative relief, it would be inequitable not to apply Subsection (4) to a pending case.
(b) In determining the application of Subsection (4), existence of a jury
verdict, court judgment, or any subsequent litigation, is prima facie evidence that Subsection (4) is not applicable.
History: C. IMS. 76-10*19, enacted by L.
1979, cfc. 79,1 9; L. 19S4, ch. 19,1 t; 19S7,
eh. 1 1 1 1.
Compiler's Notes. — Tht 1964 amendment
Meted "including the state or any of iu political subdivisions or agencies" after "A person"
la sabssc. (1); and rewrote subset (3) which
read: "Neither the state nor any of its political
subdivisions or agencies shall recover more
than the amount of damages sustained by reeeon of a violation of this together with costs of
suit and a reasonable attorney's fee."
tlie 1987 amendment divided the provisions
af fbrmtr Subsection (II into present Subsec-

tions <lMa> and UHb), substituting "the Utah
Antitrust Act" lor "this act" and deleting "appropriate" following "an action for** and "and
the court shall" following "and damages** in
Subsection 11 Ms) snd substituting **Suhsections
f3l* (4), and t5)%" for "Subjection <3>*\ inserting
"the court shall award three times the amount
of damages sustained, plus the cost of suit and
a reasonable attorney's fee** and deleting
"award three times the amount of damages
sustained, plus the costs of suit and a reasonable sttorney s fee** following "permanent injunctive relief" in Subjection <lii*)t, divided
the provisions of former Subsection (2) into

preterit Subnectiont (2Ma) and (2Kb), making
minor change throughout tho*e provision*,
and added prexent Subjection* (4) and (5)
Law Review*— A Survey of Injunctive Re
lief Under Suite and Federal Antitrust Law*,
John J Klynn. 1%7 Uuh L Rev H44
A.L.K. — l>ive*titure an available relief un
oVr I 16 of Cluyton Act (15 USCS I 26» in ac
lion by private parties, 77 A L R Fed 509
Standing of private party under I 16 of
Clayton Act (15 USCS ft 26) to seek injunction

to prevent merger or acquiftjtion allegedly prohibited under I 7 of the Act (15 USCS ft 18>,
78 A L R Fed 159.
What conntituteb impairment of proponed iniervenor't interest to nupport intervention as
matter of right under Rule 24<aH2i of Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in ant it runt actions,
78 A L R Fed 385
Propnely of preliminary injunctive relief in
private antitrust action** involving dealership
termination*, 79 A.L R Fed 44

DKC1S10NS UNDKR FORMER LAW
Requirement* for recovery of treble damftfte*.
In an action to recover treble damages for
iiyurte* compt*n*able under the former antitruat utatuteh, plaintiff* had to establish a violation of the ant. truxt provisions and also that

the act* constituting auch violation proximately caimed the damages Recovery was hnv
ited to those at whom the violation was direclly aimed or th<*e who had been directly
harmed Gammon v Federated Milk Producers
Aa*n (1963) 14 U 2d 291, 383 P 2d 402

76-10-920. Fine and/or imprisonment for violation — Certain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo contendere.
|(1)] Any person who violates section 76-10-914 by price fixing, bid rigging,
agreeing among competitor's to divide customers or territories, or by engaging
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition shall be
punished, if an individual, by a fine not to exceed $50,000 or by imprisonment
for an indeterminate time not to exceed one year, or both or, if by a person
other than an individual, a fine not to exceed $100,000. The foregoing shall
not be construed to include vertical agreements between a manufacturer, its
distributors or their subdistributors dividing customers and territories solely
involving the manufacturer's commodity or service where the manufacturer
distributes its commodity or service both directly and through distributors or
subdistributors in competition with itself.
(2) A defendant may plead nolo contendere to a charge brought under this
title but only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by
the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the
interest of the public in the effective administration of justice.
History: C. IMS, 7t-10-920. enacted by L.
1979, eh. 79, I 10.
Law Reviews. — The Utah Antitrust Act of

1979. Getting into the Stat* Antitrust Busi
nexs. 1980 Utah L Kev 73. 82-85

76-10-921. Conviction as prima facie evidence in action for
injunctive relief or damages.
In any action brought by the state, a final judgment or decree determining
that a person has criminully violated this act, other than a judgment entered
pursuant to a nolo contendere plea or a decree entered prior to the taking of
any testimony, shall be prima facie evidence against that person in any action
brought pursuant to section 76-10-919, as to all matters with respect to which
the judgment or decree would he an estoppel between the parties thereto.

Hlttorr C. 1S53,7S-10-ttl, enected by L.
1S7S, ch. 79, | U.

76-10-922. Antitrust revolving account
(1) There is created within the general fund an account to be known as the
"antitrust revolving account" for the purpose of providing funds to pay for any
costs and expenses incurred by the attorney general in relation to actions
under state or federal antitrust laws, which account shall lapse only to the
extent that it exceeds the sum of one million dollars.
(2) All monies received by the state or its agencies by reason of any judgment, settlement, or compromise as the result of any such action commenced
by the attorney general, after payment of any costs or fees allocated by the
court, shall be deposited to the antitrust revolving account except as otherwise provided in this section.
(3) The legislature may make annual appropriations to the attorney general from the antitrust revolving account or from the general fund, to such
extent as may be required for the administration and enforcement of the
antitrust laws. These funds shall be in addition to such other funds as may be
appropriated to the attorney general for the administration and enforcement
of the laws of this state.
(4) Any monies recovered by the attorney general based on an expenditure
or loss from a specific cash fund shall be credited to that fund to the extent of
the expenditure or loss. Any monies recovered by the attorney general on
behalf of any private person or public body other than the state shall be paid
to such persons or bodies. However, prior to any such credit or payment, any
expenses advanced by the attorney general in any of the above actions shall
be credited to the antitrust revolving account.
Hietory: C. 1*53, 7S.10-S22, enacted by L.
1S7S, efc. 79, i *!.

76*10-923. Attorney general to advocate competition.
The attorney general shall have the authority and responsibility to advocate the policy of competition before all political subdivisions of this state and
all public agencies whose actions may affect the interests of persons in this
state.
Hietory: C. 1S63, 7*10-913, enacted by L.

vm. A m i i i

76*10-924. Venue of actions by state — Transfer.
Any action brought by the state pursuant to this act shall be brought in any
county wherein the defendant resides or does business, or at the option of the
defendant, such action shall be transferred, upon motion made within 30 days
after commencement of the action, to Salt Lake County.
Htetorr: C ISfiH JtOft-SM. enactedfcvL.

PART 16
RACKETEERING ENTERPRISES
Section
76-10-1601.
76-10-1602
76-10-1603
76-10-1603!

Short title.
Definitions.
Unlawful acta.
. Violation a felony — Coats —
Forfeiture — Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution or reorganization — Restraining orders and injunctions — Hearings — Special
verdict — Findings — Judgment and order of forfeiture —
Seizure of property — Sale —
Proceeds — Petitions for remission or mitigation of forfeiture
— Hearing — Disposition.
76-10-1604 Enforcement authority of peace
officers.

Section
76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by a
pattern of unlawful activity —
Double damages — Costs, including attorney's fee — Arbitration — Agency — Burden of
proof — Actions by attorney
general or county attorney —
Dismissal — Statute of limitations — Authorized orders of
district court.
76-10-1606. Repealed.
76-10-1607. Evidentiary value of criminal
judgment in civil proceeding.
76-10-1608. Severability clause.
76-10-1609. Prospective application.

76-10-1601. Short tide.
This act is the Tattern of Unlawful Activity Act."
History: C. 1963, 76-10-1601, enacted by
L 1961, ch. M, I I ; L 1965, eh. S34, I 1;
1967, ch- 136, I 1.
Compiler's Notes. — The 1965 amendment
substituted "is known"far"shall be known and
may bt cited."
The 1987 amendment substituted "the Tattern of Unlawful Activity Act'" for "known sa
the Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act'".
The phrase "this act", as used in this section,
means Laws 1967, eh, 136, H 1 to 7, which
appear as II 76-10-1601 so 76-10-1603.5,
76-10-1605. 76-10-1606 sad 76-10-1606.

Public access to complaint
Defendants who alleged that their prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Criminal
Enterprises Act, 18 U.S.C.A. I 1961, and this
Utah counterpart to that statute was intended
merely to intimidate them and that the complaint should therefore remain sealed did not
overcome the common law right and interest in
public access to the complaint with a sufficient
showing of private or public harm. HuntsmanChristensen Corp. v. Entrada Indus., Inc., 639
F. Supp 733 (D. Utah 1966).

76-10-1602

CRIMINAL CODE

76-10-1602. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Unlawful activity" means to directly engage in conduct or to solicit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to
engage in conduct which would constitute any offense described by the
following crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to
engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses, regardless
of whether the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority or is
classified as a misdemeanor or a felony:
(a) assault or aggravated assault, 5§ 76-5-102 and 76-5-103;
(b) terroristic threat, i 76-5-107;
(c) criminal homicide, §5 76-5-201, 76-5-202, and 76-5-203;
(d) kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping, §§ 76-5-301 and
76-5-302;
(e) arson or aggravated arson, 5§ 76-6-102 and 76-6-103;
(0 causing a catastrophe, § 76-6-105;
(g) burglary or aggravated burglary, §§ 76-6-202 and 76-6-203;
(h) burglary of a vehicle, § 76-6-204;
(i) manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary or
theft, 5 76-6-205;
(j) robbery or aggravated robbery, §§ 76-6*301 and 76-6-302;
(k) theft, f 76-6-404;
(1) theft by deception, § 76-6-405;
(m) theft by extortion, § 76-6-406;
(n) receiving stolen property, § 76-6-408;
(o) theft of services, § 76-6-409;
(p) forgery, 5 76-6-501;
(q) fraudulent use of a credit card, (5 76-6-506.1, 76-6-506.2, and
76-6-506.4;
(r) computer fraud, Part 7, Chapter 76, Title 6;
(s) bribery or receiving bribe by person in the business of selection,
appraisal, or criticism of goods, § 76-6-508;
(t) bribery of a labor official, 5 76-6-509;
(u) defrauding creditors, 5 76-6-511;
(v) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial institution,
f 76-6-512;
(w) unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, 5 76-6-513;
(x) bribery or threat to influence contest, § 76-6-514;
(y) making a false credit report, i 76-6-517;
(z) criminal simulation, 5 76-6-518;
(aa) criminal usury, § 76-6-520;
(bb) false or fraudulent insurance claim, 5 76-6-521;
(cc) sale of a child, 5 76-7-203;
(dd) bribery to influence official or political actions, § 76-8-103;
(ee) threats to influence official or political action, 5 76-8-104;
(fl) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant, § 76-8-105;
(gg) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of person as public
servant, f 76-8-106;
(hh) official misconduct, 55 76-8-201 and 76-8-202;
(ii) obstructing justice, f 76-8-306;

OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC WELFARE

76-10-1602

(jj) acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution,
I 76-8-308;
(kk) false or inconsistent material statements, 5 76-8-502;
(II) false or inconsistent statements, § 76-8-503;
(mm) written false statements, § 76-8-504;
(nn) tampering with a witness, retaliation against a witness or
informant, or bribery, § 76-8-508;
(oo) extortion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding,
f 76-8-509;
(pp) tampering with evidence, § 76-8-510;
(qq) intentionally or knowingly causing one animal to fight with
another, Subsection 76-9-301(1X0;
(rr) delivery to common carrier, mailing, or placement on premises
of an infernal machine, § 76-10-307;
(as) construction or possession of infernal machine, § 76-10-308;
(tt) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assault,
I 76-10-507;
(uu) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, § 76-10-521;
(w) alteration of number or mark on pistol or revolver,
I 76-10-522;
(ww) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade name, or trade
device, i 76-10-1002;
(zx) selling goods under counterfeited trademark, trade name, or
trade devices, § 76-10-1003;
(yy) sales in containers bearing registered trademark of substituted articles, i 76-10-1004;
(zz) selling or dealing with article bearing registered trademark or'
service mark with intent to defraud, § 76-10-1006;
(aaa) gambling, S 76-10-1102;
(bbb) gambling fraud, 6 76-10-1103;
(ccc) gambling promotion, § 76-10-1104;
(ddd) possessing a gambling device or record, § 76-10-1105;
(eee) confidence game, § 76-10-1109;
(ffi) distributing pornographic material, § 76-10-1204;
(ggg) inducing acceptance of pornographic material, § 76-10-1205;
(hhh) dealing in harmful material to a minor, § 76-10-1206;
(iii) distribution of pornographic films, § 76-10-1222;
(jjjj) indecent public displays, f 76-10-1228;
(kkk) prostitution, ft 76-10-1302;
(III) aiding prostitution, ft 76-10-1304;
(mmm) exploiting prostitution, f 76-10-1305;
(mm) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, ft 76-10-1306;
(ooo) sexual exploitation of a minor, 5 76-5a-3;
(ppp) communications fraud, I 76-10-1801;
(qqq) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 37,
Title 68, the Utah Controlled Substances Act, or Chapter 37b, Title
66, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act;
(rnr) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 1,
Title 61, the Utah Uniform Securities Act;
(sss) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 11,
Title 67, the Land and Timeshare Sales Practices Act;
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(ttt) false claims for public assistance, § 55-15a-31;
(uuu) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 56,
Title 63, the Utah Procurement Code;
(vw) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of the laws
governing taxation in this state;
(www) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 12,
Title 32a, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act;
(xxx) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 10,
Title 13, the Recording Practices Act;
(yyy) deceptive business practices, § 76-6-507; and
(zzz) any act illegal under the laws of the United States and enumerated in Title 18, Section 1961 (1) (B), (C), and (D) of the United
States Code.
(2) "Enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities.
(3) "Pattern of unlawful activity" means engaging in conduct which
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity,
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes,
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related either to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes comprising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 31,
1981. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by this part shall have occurred within five years of the
commission of the next preceding act alleged as part of the pattern.
(4) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and local governmental entities.
History: C. 1963, 76-10-1602, enacted by
1* 1967, eh. 13a, 12.
Compiler's Notes. — Lews 1987, eh. 238,
1 2 repeal. Conner • 76-10-1S02, a. last

amended by Laws 19S5, eh. 234, f 2, reliting
to definition*, and enact* the present tectum
-^ . . „ .
. n p.
. . e
AAO
p . ^ 1 ^

76-10*1603. Unlawful acts.
(1) It is unlawful for any person who has received any proceeds derived,
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which
the person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds
derivedfromthe investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise.
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any
enterprise.
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of
that enterprise's affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity.
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pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation of any provision of 5 76-10-1603.
(2) If a violation oft 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity
consisting of acts or conduct in violation of S 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the property subject to forfeiture under this section
is limited to property, the seizure or forfeiture of which would not constitute a
prior restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the
Utah Constitution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the exercise of those rights.
(3) In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by law for a violation of
I 76-10-1603, a defendant who derives profits or other proceeds from a conduct prohibited by I 76-10-1603, may be fined not more than twice the
amount of the gross profits or other proceeds.
(4) Except under Subsection (2), property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes:
(a) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in
land; and
(b) tangible and intangible personal property including money, rights,
privileges, interests, claims, and securities of any kind;
(c) but does not include property legitimately exchanged for services
rendered in connection with a defendant's exercise of hisrightsunder the
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the right
to appear and be defended by counsel in criminal prosecutions guaranteed
by Article I, Sec. 12 of the Utah Constitution.
(6) Upon conviction for violating any provision of 5 76-10-1603, and in
addition to any penalty prescribed by law and in addition to any forfeitures
provided for in this section, the court may do any or all of the following:
(a) order the person to divest himself of any interest in or any control,
direct or indirect, of any enterprise;
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments of any person, including prohibiting the personfromengaging in
the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the
Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United States permit; or
(c) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(6) If a violation of I 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity
eonsisting of acta or conduct in violation or f 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205,
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order that would
amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected party'srightsunder
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I,
Sec 16 of the Utah Constitution.
(7) (a) All rights, title, and interest in forfeitable property described in
Subsections (1) and (2) vest in the state if the action was brought by the
attorney general or in the county if the action was brought by a county
attorney, upon the commission of the act or conduct giving rise to the
forfeiture under this section.
(b) Anyforfeitableproperty that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the sutyect of a special proceeding
and an order that the property be forfeited to the state or the county,
unless the transferee establishes in a hearing held under Subsection (14)
that he is a bonafidepurchaser for value of the property who at the time
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(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of
Subsection (1), (2), or (3).
History: C. IMS, I 76-10-1 SOS, enacted by
L. 1S67, eh. S3S, I S .
CompUer'e Notea. — Laws 1987, eh. 238,
I 3 repeals former I 76-10-1603, aa last

amended by Laws 1985, eh 234, I 3, relating
to unlawful acta, felony, and forfeiture*, and
enacta the present section.

ANALYSIS

Conspiracy.
Pattern of racketeering activity.
Conspiracy.
Although conspiracy is one of the en innerated acta of racketeering under I 76-10-1602,
it is not a separate basis for recovery under
this section but is merely a crime that may
qualify as one of the predicate acta needed to
ahow a pattern of racketeering activity; standing alone, a charge of conspiracy does not state
a cause of action under this section. Bache
Halaey Stuart Shielda, Inc. v. Tracy Coilina
Bank * Trust Co. (D. Utah 1983) 658 FSupp
1H42

Pattern of racketeering activity.
A pattern of racketeering activity requires
more than the mere commission of two or more
episodes of racketeering conduct within five
years of each other. To form a "pattern," the
commission of predicate acta or episodes of
criminality must be sufficiently continuous
*»<* interrelated. That is, a "pattern" requires
planned, ongoing, continuing crime and the
**«•* of continuing criminal conduct, aa opP 0 8 ^ to »poradi^ isolated cnmrna! episodee or
eventa. Cook v. Zions First Natl Bank, 645 F.
8upp. 423 (D. Utah 1986).

76-10-1603.5. Violation a felony — Costs — Forfeiture —
Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution
or reorganization — Restraining orders and injunctions — Hearings — Special verdict — Findings — Judgment and order of forfeiture — Seizure of property — Sale — Proceeds — Petitions
for remission or mitigation of forfeiture — Hearing — Disposition.
(1) A person who violates any provision of 5 76-10-1603 is guilty of a second
degree felony. In addition to penalties prescribed by law, the court may order
the person found guilty of the felony to pay to the state, if the attorney general
brought the action, or to the county, if the county attorney brought the action,
the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense and the costs of securing
the forfeitures provided for in this section. The person shall forfeit to the state
or the county:
(a) any interest acquired or maintained in violation of any provision of
f 76-10-1603;
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or
eontractural right of any kind affording a source of influence over any
enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of § 76-10-1603; and
(c) any property constituting or derived from any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly,fromthe conduct constituting the
pattern of unlawful activity orfromany act or conduct constituting the
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of purchase reasonably believed that the property was not subject to forfeiture under this section.
(8) (a) Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, the
court may enter restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of
satisfactory performance bonds, or take any other action to preserve for
forfeiture under this section any forfeitable property described in Subsections (1) and (2):
(i) upon filing of an indictment or an information charging a violation of § 76-10-1603 and alleging that the property with respect to
which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject
to forfeiture under this section; or
(ii) prior to the filing of the indictment or information, if, after
notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property and
after affording them an opportunity for a hearing, the court determines that:
(A) there is a substantial probability that the state will prevail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order
will result in the property being sold, distributed, exhibited, destroyed, or removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or otherwise made unavailable for forfeiture; and
(B) the need to preserve the availability of the property or
prevent its sale, distribution, exhibition, destruction, or removal
through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship
on any party against whom the order is to be entered;
(iii) an order entered under Subsection (ii) is effective for no more
than 90 days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown of
unless an indictment or information as described in Subsection (i) has
been filed.
(b) A temporary restraining order may be entered upon application of
the attorney general or a county attorney without notice or opportunity
for a hearing, when an information or indictment has not yet been filed
with respect to the property, if the attorney general or county attorney
demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject to forfeiture, under this section and that provision of notice
would jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture or would
jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. The temporary order expires not more than ten days after it is entered unless extended for good
cause shown or unless the party against whom it is entered consents to an
extension. A hearing concerning an order entered under this subsection
shall be held as soon as possible, and prior to the expiration of the temporary order.
(c) The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding
evidence it may receive and consider at any hearing held under this
subsection.
(9) (a) Upon conviction of a peraon for violating any provision of
I 76-10-1603, the jury, if the case was tried to a jury, shall be instructed
and asked to return a special verdict as to whether any of the property
identified in the information or indictment is forfeitable under Subsections 76-10-1603.6(1) and (2).
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(b) If the case is tried without a jury, the judge shall make specific
written findings if he determines that the property identified in the information or indictment is forfeitable under Subsections 76-10-1603.5(1) and
(2). Whether property is forfeitable shall be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.
(10) (a) Upon conviction of a person for violating any provision of
§ 76-10-1603 and upon the jury's special verdict or the judge's finding
that the property is forfeitable, the court shall enter a judgment and order
of forfeiture of the property to the state or the county and shall authorize
the attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property ordered
forfeited upon the terms stated by the court in its order. Following the
entry of an order declaring property forfeited, the court may, upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, enter appropriate
restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory
performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accountants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the
state or county in property ordered forfeited.
(b) Any income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an interest in an enterprise or property which has been ordered forfeited under
this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the
enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect
the interests of the state or county or third parties.
(11) (a) After seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the
attorney general or the county attorney shall direct the disposition of the
property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making provision for the rights of any innocent persons. Any property right or interest
not exercisable by or transferable for value to the state or the county,
expires and does not revert to the defendant. The defendant or any person
acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant is not eligible to
purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the attorney general or the
county attorney.
(b) The court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the property pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise
to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the
sale or disposition of the property would result in irreparable injury,
harm, or toes to him.
(c) The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property forfeited
under this section and any moneys forfeited may be used first to pay
expenses of the forfeiture and the sale, including expenses of seizure,
maintenance, and custody of the property pending its disposition, advertising, and court coats.
(12) Regarding property ordered forfeited under this section, the attorney
general or the county attorney may:
(a) grant petitions for mitigation or remission of forfeiture, restore forfeited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other
action to protect the rights of innocent persons in the interest of justice
and as is consistent with the provisions of this section;
(b) compromise claims arising under this section;
(c) award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a
forfeiture under this section;
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(d) direct the disposition by the state or the county of all property
ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other commercially feasible means, making provision for the rights of innocent persons;
(e) destroy or otherwise dispose of property determined to be obscene
or pornographic; and
(f) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain
property ordered forfeited under this section pending its disposition.
(13) Except under Subsection (16), a party claiming an interest in property
subject to forfeiture under this section:
(a) may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving
the forfeiture of property under this section; and
(b) may not commence an action at law or equity against the state or
the county concerning the validity of his alleged interests in the property
subsequent to the filing of an indictment or an information alleging that
the property is subject to forfeiture under this section.
(14) The district court of the state which has jurisdiction of a case under
this part may enter orders under this section without regard to location of any
property which may be subject to forfeiture under this section, or which has
been ordered forfeited under this section.
(15) To facilitate the identification or location of property declared forfeited
and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of
forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring property forfeited to the state
or county, the court may, upon application of the attorney general or the
county attorney, order that the testimony of any witness relating to the property forfeited be taken by deposition, and that any book, paper, document,
record, recording, or other material not privileged shall be produced as provided for depositions and discovery under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
(16) (a) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the
attorney general or the county attorney shall publish notice of the order
and of its intent to dispose of the property as the court may direct. The
attorney general or the county attorney may also provide direct written
notice to any person known to have an alleged interest in the property
subject to the order of forfeiture, as a substitute for published notice as to
those persona so notified.
(b) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest in
property which has been ordered forfeited to the state or to the county
under this section may, within 30 days of the final publication of notice or
his receipt of notice under Subsection (16)(a), whichever is earlier, petition the court for a hearing to abjudicate the validity of his alleged interest in the property. The hearing is held before the court without a jury.
(c) The petition shall be in writing and signed by the petitioner under
penalty of perjury. It shall set forth the nature and extent of the petitioner's right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circumstances of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the
property, and any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and
the relief sought.
(d) The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable, be held
within 30 days of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate the
hearing on the petition and any petition filed by any other person under
this section, other than the defendant.
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(e) At the hearing, the petitioner may testify and present evidence and
witnesses on his own behalf and cross-examine witnesses who appear at
the hearing. The attorney general or county attorney may present evidence and witnesses in rebuttal and in defense of the claim to the property and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition
to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall consider the relevant portion of the record of the criminal case which resulted
in the order of forfeiture. The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of
Evidence at a hearing held under this subsection.
(0 The court shall amend the order of forfeiture in accordance with its
determination, if after the hearing the court determines that the petitioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the petitioner has a legal right, title, or interest in the property,
and the right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid
in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in
the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right,
title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of the
acts or conduct which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under
this section; or
(ii) the petitioner is a bona fide purchaser for value of the right,
title, or interest in the property and at the time of purchase reasonably believed that the property was not subject to forfeiture under
this section,
(g) Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under this
subsection, or if no petitions are filed following the expiration of the
period provided in Subsection (16Kb) for the filing of petitions, the state or
the county has clear title to property subject to the order of forfeiture and
may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or transferee.
History: C. 1S53, I 7t-10>lS03.5, enacted
by L. 1SS7, ck S3S, | 4.

76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers.
Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah
shall have authority to enforce the criminal provisions of this act by initiating
investigations, assisting grand juries, obtaining indictments, filing informations, and assisting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the attorney
general or county attorneys* offices.
Htoorjr: C. ISM, ?S»10»1«M, enacted by

L, ISS1, A R I L
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76-10-1605. Remedies of person injured by a pattern of unlawful activity — Double damages — Costs, including attorney's fee — Arbitration — Agency —
Burden of proof — Actions by attorney general
or county attorney — Dismissal — Statute of limitations — Authorized orders of district court.
(1) A person iryured in his person, business, or property by a person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of § 76-10-1603 may sue in an
appropriate district court and recover twice the damages he sustains, regardless of whether:
(a) the injury is separate or distinct from the injury suffered as a result
of the acts or conduct constituting the pattern of unlawful conduct alleged
as part of the cause of action; or
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal by any court of the state or
of the United States.
(2) A party who prevails on a cause of action brought under this section
recovers the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(3) All actions arising under this section which are grounded in fraud are
subject to arbitration under Chapter 31, Title 78.
(4) In all actions under this section, a principal is liable for actual damages
for harm caused by an agent acting within the scope of either his employment
or apparent authority. A principal is liable for double damages only if the
pattern of unlawful activity alleged and proven as part of the cause of action
was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, undertaken, performed, or
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent
acting within the scope of his employment.
(5) In all actions arising under this section, the burden of proof is clear and
convincing evidence.
(6) The attorney general or any county attorney may maintain actions under this section on behalf of the state, the county, or any person iqjured by a
person engaged in conduct forbidden by any provision of i 76-10-1603, to
prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined in this section and may recover
the damages and costs allowed by this section.
(7) In all actions under this section, the elements of each claim or cause of
action shall be stated with particularity against each defendant.
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted by a private
party under this section is dismissed prior to trial or disposed of on summary
judgment, or if it is determined at trial that there is no liability, the prevailing party shall recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses incurred because
of the defense against the action, claim, or counterclaim, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall be commenced
within three years after the conduct prohibited by I 76-10-1603 terminates or
the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any
limitation to the contrary.
(10) (a) In any action brought under this section, the district court has
Jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy iryury as defined by this sec-
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tion by issuing appropriate orders after making provisions for the rights
of innocent persons.
(b) Before liability is determined in any action brought under this section, the district court may:
(i) issue restraining orders and injunctions;
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any other bond it
considers appropriate and necessary in connection with any property
or any requirement imposed upon a party by the court; and
(iii) enter any other order the court considers necessary and
proper.
(c) After a determination of liability, the district court may, in addition
to granting the relief allowed in Subsection (1), do any one or all of the
following:
(i) order any person to divest himself of any interest in or any
control, direct or indirect, of any enterprise;
(ii) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or investments or any person, including prohibiting any person from engaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to
the extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United
States permit; or
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise.
(d) However, if an action is brought to obtain any relief provided by
this section, and if the conduct prohibited by § 76-10-1603 has for its
pattern of unlawful activity acts or conduct illegal under § 76-10-1204,
76-10-1205,76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order
that would amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected
party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, or Article I, Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. The court
shall, upon the request of any affected party, and upon the notice to all
parties, prior to the issuance of any order provided for in this subsection,
and at any later time, hold hearings as necessary to determine whether
any materials at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine if
there is probable cause to believe that any act or conduct alleged violates
I 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222. In making its findings the court shall be guided by the same considerations required of a
court making similar findings in criminal cases brought under
i 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, including, but not
limited to, the definitions in §§ 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-1216,
and the exemptions in I 76-10-1226.
Rislorr C. ISM, | Tf.10-1906, ****** by
L» 1987, ok. 898, 1 8 .
CompUar't Notes. — Laws 1987, ch. S38,
I 8 repealed former I 78-10-1805, at enacted

by U w t 1981, ch 94.1 1, relating to ramedica
of a perton injured by a pattern of racketeering
activity, and enacts the present taction.

76-10-1606. Repealed.
Hepnslt — Lawt 1987, cb. 188,1 8 rtpaalt
I 76-10-1606, at last amended by Lawt 1985,

ch. 834,1 4, relating to paymentt to the ftnera! fund of the elate or a county.
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76-6-508. Bribery of or receiving bribe by person in the business of
•election, appraisal, or criticism of goods or lervioes.—(1) A person is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor when, without the consent of the employer
or principal, contrary to the interests of the employer or principal:
(a) He confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the employee, agent,
or fiduciary of an employer or principal any benefit with the purpose of
Influencing the conduct of the employee, agent, or fiduciary in relating to
his employer's or principal's affairs; or
TO He, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or principal, solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit from another upon an
agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence his conduct in
relation to his employer's or principal's affairs ;\provided that this section
does not apply to inducements made or accepted solely for the purpose of
causing a change in employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary.
(2) A person is guilty of violation of this section if he holds himself
out to the public as being engaged in the business of making disinterested
selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods or services and he solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to influence his selection, appraisal,
or criticism.

